

Portland State University

PDXScholar

Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

2001

Oregon soldiers and the Portland press in the Philippine wars of 1898 and 1899 : how Oregonians defined the race of Filipinos and the mission of America

Sean F. McEnroe

Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds



Part of the [Military History Commons](#)

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

McEnroe, Sean F., "Oregon soldiers and the Portland press in the Philippine wars of 1898 and 1899 : how Oregonians defined the race of Filipinos and the mission of America" (2001). *Dissertations and Theses*. Paper 4028.

<https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5912>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

THESIS APPROVAL

The abstract and thesis of Sean F. McEnroe for the Master of Arts in History were presented October 31, 2001, and accepted by the thesis committee and the department.

COMMITTEE APPROVALS:



Bernard W. Burke, Chair



David A. Johnson




Michael F. Reardon



Thomas Biolsi
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies

DEPARTMENT APPROVAL:



Lois Becker, Chair
Department of History

ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Sean F. McEnroe for the Master of Arts in History
presented October 31, 2001.

Title: Oregon Soldiers and the Portland Press in the Philippine Wars of 1898 and
1899: How Oregonians Defined the Race of Filipinos and the Mission of
America

Oregon volunteer soldiers fought two wars in the Philippines from 1898 to
1899, one against the Spanish colonial government (from May to August 1898), and
one against the Philippine insurgency (beginning in February of 1899). This thesis
examines the connections between Oregonians' racial characterization of Filipinos and
their beliefs about the wars' purposes and moral characteristics. The source material is
drawn from the personal papers of Oregon volunteer soldiers and from the *Portland
Oregonian*.

Writers for the *Oregonian* understood the war against Spain in reference to two
notions of American greatness: one of ideological greatness based on America's
revolutionary origins, and one of racial greatness based on the story of Anglo-Saxon

expansion and rule in North America. As the U.S. troops' activities shifted from fighting the Spanish Empire to conquering the Philippines, the ideological vision of America's identity and mission disappeared. It was replaced by two competing racial conceptions of Anglo-Saxon greatness: one of America as the inheritor of Great Britain's responsibilities as benevolent colonial ruler; the other of Anglo-Saxon triumph in a global struggle for survival between the races. The newspaper's racial characterization of the Filipinos paralleled these shifts in world-view, culminating in the notion of "Indian war."

Oregon soldiers did not understand the wars in the Philippines as political or ideological struggles. For them, the war was a continuation of the European-American expansion and rule that had tamed the American West. During the period of cooperation with the Philippine insurgency, Oregon soldiers recorded a variety of racial attitudes toward the Filipinos—sometimes affectionate and paternalistic, sometimes ambivalent, and sometimes hostile. They categorized the race of locals as "asiatic," "negro," or "native" depending on their attitudes toward them. However, once the Oregon soldiers came face to face with Filipinos as enemies, they invariably described them as "Indians" or "Niggers." They came to understand the fight as a race war against Filipino soldiers and civilians, and one in which few codes of ethical conduct applied.

OREGON SOLDIERS AND THE PORTLAND PRESS
IN THE PHILIPPINE WARS OF 1898 AND 1899:
HOW OREGONIANS DEFINED THE RACE OF FILIPINOS AND
THE MISSION OF AMERICA

by
SEAN F. MCENROE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
HISTORY

Portland State University
2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILIPPINE WARS.....	1
II.	THE CUBAN AND PHILIPPINE REBELLIONS VIEWED THROUGH THE PAGES OF THE <i>PORTLAND</i> <i>OREGONIAN</i> , 1895-1899	15
	<i>The Cuban Rebels</i> 16	
	<i>The Philippines during the War with Spain</i> 19	
	<i>America in the Image of Britain</i> 31	
	<i>Kipling the Prophet</i> 35	
	<i>The Philippines as the New Frontier</i> 38	
	<i>Filipinos as Indians</i> 40	
	<i>Theories of Racial Domination and Genocide</i> 44	
	<i>Manhood and the Cult of Death</i> 51	
III.	OBSERVATIONS OF THE OREGON SOLDIERS, MAY 1898-JULY 1900.....	55
	<i>Personal and Political Motives of Oregon Soldiers</i> 55	
	<i>Racial Taxonomies</i> 60	
	<i>Visions of the Filipinos inside and outside the Walls</i> 73	
	<i>The Black Filipino</i> 76	
	<i>The Filipino as Indian</i> 98	
IV.	CONCLUSION	103
	NOTES.....	108
	WORKS CITED	123

I. An Introduction to the Philippine Wars

Between the spring of 1898 and the spring of 1902, the United States waged two wars in the Philippines. It is difficult to summarize these turn-of-the-century struggles in terms that are both accurate and concise. In the parlance of the time, the fight against the Spanish at Manila was merely one operation in “the War with Spain,” while the subsequent fight against Philippine nationalists was referred to as the suppression of “the Philippine Insurrection.” Though they are sometimes conflated in popular memory as elements of the Spanish-American War, these were two separate wars with different adversaries and different objectives.

The first wave of American infantry to land in the Philippines was sent to capture Manila and thus weaken Spain in its struggle with the U.S. over Cuba. In this, the Americans soldiers were aided by an informal alliance with the native Philippine insurgency, which, like the Cuban rebel army, was fighting for independence from the Spanish Empire. However, within six months, the same American soldiers found themselves at war with their recent Filipino allies. The following summary of events describes the changing military and diplomatic relationships between Spain, the

United States, and the Filipinos, as well as the changing role assigned to the American soldiers from the spring of 1898 to the summer of 1899.

Few observers were surprised on April 11, 1898 when President McKinley made his request to Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. America's grievances against Spain were not new, and the question of U.S. intervention in the Spanish-Cuban conflict had been a matter of public debate during the three years since the Cuban Rebellion had begun. The declaration of war was passed on April 21, and two days later, McKinley issued a proclamation calling for volunteer soldiers. Those who enlisted were joining a popular cause, and one that had been clearly articulated by the president. In his war message to Congress, McKinley emphasized the following objectives: stopping the "barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries" of the Spanish war in Cuba; protecting the lives and property of American citizens; and safeguarding peaceful commerce in the region.¹ McKinley made no mention of the Philippines, and few of the eager conscripts could have anticipated that they might serve there.

In Portland, Oregon, a multitude of young men from around the state converged to enlist in the Volunteer Army. Most were members of the Oregon National Guard, but since National Guard units could not be deployed abroad,

volunteers were reenlisted and reorganized as the Second Oregon U.S. Volunteer Infantry.² While National Guard units across the nation assembled for the same purpose, America's Pacific fleet, under the command of Commodore George Dewey, carried out an existing plan to weaken Spain by striking at her fleet in the Philippines. When word of Dewey's dramatic victory at Manila Bay reached the United States, the Oregon Volunteers were already drilling at a hastily constructed army camp in Portland. Not until May 3 did the *Portland Oregonian* suggest that the deployment of the state's volunteers to the Philippines was likely.³

Within two weeks, the Oregonians had been transported by train to the West Coast's Volunteer Army camp in San Francisco; by the end of the month, they were already at sea, bound for the Philippines. After a lavish reception by American annexationists in Hawaii, and the uneventful capture of a Spanish fortress in Guam, the Oregonians arrived at Manila Bay on June 30, 1898. Even before landing, the soldiers could glimpse the complex situation confronting them. The wreckage of the Spanish fleet was still visible, and Dewey's ships blockaded the Spanish port. American regulars who had sailed with Dewey had established a beachhead to the south of Manila at Cavite, and the army of the Philippine independence movement besieged Manila from the north. As the volunteers entered the bay, an exchange of fire

between the Spanish and the Philippine insurgency was visible.⁴ It was clear to all concerned that the American troops would serve at the intersection of two wars: one between Spain and the United States, and another between the Filipinos and their Spanish rulers.

In the Philippines, as in Cuba, the struggle between the native insurgency and Spanish colonial forces had long preceded the American attack. A reformist nationalism among Filipino and mestizo elites had become a significant political force in the early 1890s, but in 1896 a more radical nationalism was advanced by the new Katipunan Party, which appealed to a broader segment of the population and organized its members for a war of independence. In August of 1896, a guerilla war commenced between the Spanish and the Katipuneros.⁵ By December of 1897, the poorly equipped rebels found themselves at a significant disadvantage even as the Spanish wearied of the war. The result was a negotiated settlement in which the insurgent leaders agreed to disarm their followers and accept exile in exchange for a cash payment.⁶ These leaders (sometimes later referred to as the Hong Kong Junta) departed to Hong Kong where they sought to arrange arms purchases and gain recognition and assistance from friendly nations.

In March of 1898, as the Hong Kong Junta solicited aid from abroad, its supporters in Luzon and the Visayan Islands to the south renewed the war at home. The coincidence of these events with the escalation of diplomatic conflict between Spain and the United States over Cuba created a sudden convergence of interests between American military planning and the Hong Kong Junta's revolutionary ambitions. Within a few days of America's declaration of war, the U.S. consul in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, met with the junta's chief military commander, Emilio Aguinaldo. Pratt and the American consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman, in consultation with Admiral Dewey, arranged to conduct arms purchases for the Filipinos and to transport the junta to Luzon.⁷

The junta leaders arrived in Luzon after Dewey's naval victory. Their leadership, along with a supply of captured Spanish arms furnished by the Americans, contributed to an already substantial uprising that now drew additional strength from deserters who left the ranks of Spain's native infantry units for the rebel lines. When the Oregon soldiers arrived, as part of an American volunteer force under General Thomas Anderson, they found themselves spectators to a simultaneous American naval blockade and Philippine siege against the Spanish forces in Manila.

During the Month of July, more reinforcements arrived from the United States, and the American Army entrenched itself outside the city walls. The Philippine and American armies now faced the same adversary, but with conflicting objectives. On June 12, the rebel leaders had issued a declaration of independence from Spain, and on July 24, they began organizing a republic. They sought to expel the Spanish with the assistance of the United States and to exercise sovereignty throughout the islands. Yet, U.S. commanders were still conducting a war against Spain, and their objective was to occupy the enemy's colonial capital. On the eve of the U.S. attack on Manila, the American commanders delivered a warning to Aguinaldo that any attempt by the latter to occupy the city would be met with force.⁸

After negotiations between Admiral Dewey and Spanish Governor Don Fermin Jaudenes, the city was surrendered with a token fight on August 13. Ironically, by the time American soldiers marched through the gates, diplomats in Paris had already signed an armistice suspending the wars in Cuba and the Philippines. Though the Philippine Army had held Manila under siege for months, Dewey denied it entrance. In the months that followed, great uncertainty surrounded the conflicting claims of Spain, the United States, and the emergent Philippine Republic. The terms of the Spanish-American armistice left the U.S. in possession of Manila until the peace

conference reached a final agreement on the fate of the Philippines. The Philippine army, which claimed to operate under the mandate of the new republic, remained encamped on the outskirts of Manila and awaited acceptance of Philippine rule. The American troops within the walls had become the occupying authority in a large and troubled city. They carried out municipal functions while awaiting word from Paris. They guarded the perimeter of the city against any move by the Philippine army and policed its streets to suppress any internal uprising.⁹

This tense and ambiguous confrontation between the U.S. and Philippine armies continued as the Spanish-American peace talks dragged on. Then, on December 12, a peace treaty ceding all of the Philippines to the United State was signed. Yet, the ratification of the treaty still required approval by the U.S. Senate. In the meantime, both armies at Manila waited, aware that the passage of the treaty would leave the United States and the Philippine Republic in a diplomatic and military deadlock, with both claiming absolute sovereignty. In the rest of the Philippines, the nationalist forces (which were not represented at the peace talks) continued to carry out their war against Spanish positions outside the area of U.S. occupation.

By January, tensions between the two armies at Manila were high. They gathered intelligence and tested each other's resolve in a variety of minor incidents.

On the neighboring island of Panay, U.S. vessels at the harbor of Iloilo were at an impasse with Philippine soldiers who refused to permit them to land and occupy the Spanish citadel. In Manila, American soldiers were called to arms in a series of false alarms, while growing numbers of the city's residents crossed the American lines to join their countrymen. Late at night on February 4, 1899, a scuffle between U.S. sentries and Filipino soldiers erupted into a full-scale battle that initiated a new war.

As this second war commenced in the Philippines, the U.S. Senate was concluding its debate on the terms of peace with Spain. On February 6, 1899 the Paris treaty was ratified. The Spanish and U.S. governments had now both approved American annexation of the Philippines; however, from the city of Malolos in Luzon, Filipino leaders claimed to speak for a national republic now engaged in a defensive war against American conquest.¹⁰ The American soldiers followed up the first night's battle with a steady advance. The U.S. military continued to govern the native population of Manila while attempting to clear the surrounding suburbs and villages of the enemy. These soldiers, most of whom had seen only one day of combat against the Spanish, were now thrust into a much bigger war.

The new war placed the American volunteers in an unanticipated military position; it also left their superiors in the War Department with legal and practical

difficulties. The terms of enlistment for volunteer soldiers limited their service to the duration of the war. Technically, once the ratified treaty with Spain went into effect, the soldiers that had volunteered in the spring of 1898 would have to be released. Yet, with a new war on their hands, American commanders could not afford to discharge the volunteers, who comprised the majority of the army, until a new wave of recruits arrived to relieve them.

The Oregon Volunteers served in Manila during the first weeks of the war, but later fought along the Pasig River, in the northern campaign to capture the Philippine capital at Malolos, and in several engagements close to Manila. With the summer monsoon season bringing most operations to a halt, and replacement troops arriving from the U.S., the Oregon Volunteers were permitted to depart the Philippines on June 12 and 13, 1899. They were mustered out in San Francisco on August 7, and most reached their homes in Oregon within a few days. Yet, in the Philippines, the war continued. The Philippine nationalists continued to resist occupation by keeping a regular army in the field until December of 1899. Thereafter, the conflict became a collection of simultaneous, regional guerilla wars. Even the capture and capitulation of the Philippine president in March of 1901 did not bring the war to an end. Until the

spring of 1902, fighting continued on the island of Samar and in the Batangas region of Luzon.

The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars were the United States' first substantial transoceanic military projects. Any study of the period offers remarkable opportunities for exploring American attitudes on expansion, colonialism, race, and national destiny at the close of the nineteenth century. Many histories of these wars have focused on the intellectual trends that influenced America's entry into the war against Spain, and that informed debates over the annexation of the Philippines. Far fewer have investigated the psychological and intellectual responses of the soldiers and the general public to the Philippine Wars.¹¹

In the late nineteenth century, the expansion of U.S. economic power, diplomatic influence, and hemispheric authority was stunning. The trends in economic, political, and military thinking reflected this growth. Much has been written on the influence of contemporary notions of market expansion, naval security, and racial Darwinism on America's ambitions in these wars. However, most academic work has focused on the history of these ideas within academic and political circles. This study of the Philippine war does not address intellectual trends among academic and policy elites or speculate on connections between popular sentiment and national

policy. It seeks merely to characterize the responses of one regional community to America's activities in the Philippines.

The Philippine War was fought largely by volunteers—men who offered their services freely, and whose duties in the military were an interruption, not a renunciation, of normal professional and civic lives. The Oregon Volunteers were among the first Americans sent to the islands, and they were asked to execute a series of very different policies during their year of service. They first fought against the Spanish in loose alliance with the Philippine nationalists; they then occupied Manila when U.S. claims over the islands were uncertain; and, in the end, they fought to wrest control of Luzon from the emerging Philippine government. Because these volunteers were ordinary citizens before the war, but immediate observers and participants in the war, the record of their reflections on these events is especially valuable. The personal papers of the Oregon soldiers reveal to us ordinary citizens' expectations about America's international mission; they also reveal how the experience of war shaped the soldiers' understanding of themselves and their nation in contrast to their adversaries.

This thesis draws on two pools of source material: the personal papers of Oregon soldiers, and the daily coverage and commentary on the war in the *Portland*

Oregonian. As the state's largest and most influential paper, the *Oregonian* provides a record of the information available to Oregonians about the war abroad. It shows us how Oregonians were given to understand America's role in the world before the war, and how that understanding evolved while the Oregon Volunteers served in the Philippines. The points of continuity between the soldiers' and the *Oregonian's* accounts of the war reveal the shared assumptions of Americans from their time and region. The points of contrast between the soldiers' and journalists' reactions to events and policy indicate the ways in which the experience of combat and occupation reshaped the volunteers' understanding of their personal and national missions.

Portland newspapermen and Oregon soldiers described the Philippine Wars according to current notions of nationality, race, and political identity. They saw America's distant military projects as a sign of the nation's great destiny. Naturally, they sought to understand the United States in reference to its own past, and in comparison to the world's other great powers.

Looking back from the 1890s, Americans could make two impressive claims about their own history: On one hand, they were the originators of a successful experiment in revolutionary republicanism; on the other, they were the conquerors of a vast continent. In some quarters, America's fight against the Spanish Empire,

alongside Cuban and Filipino republicans, may have appealed to the old revolutionary image of the United States, but for the Oregonians at home and abroad, the romance of the republic was soon displaced by a metanarrative borrowed from the conquest of the western frontier.

During the war against Spain, the *Oregonian* sometimes described the conflict, in political terms, as a struggle against a tyrannical empire. The Cubans and Filipinos were sometimes presented in a favorable light as partners in the good fight. However, once the Spanish were beaten, the *Oregonian's* treatment of the Philippines and its people changed. The islands, now nominally in the hands of the United States, were described as an unsettled frontier, and its inhabitants as Indians. With the conquest of the West now carried across the sea, America's great destiny became both territorial and racial. In seeking a place for America among the great powers, the *Oregonian* recast America as the inheritor of England's racial and cultural mission. The Philippines became the new frontier; and America became the new British Empire.

When Oregonians volunteered for war in the spring of 1898, they did so out patriotism and personal ambition, but not political conviction. Unlike the *Oregonian*, they wasted little time dispensing with ideological objections to foreign conquest. Even before their mission shifted from defeating the Spanish to defeating the

Filipinos, the soldiers had come to understand the local population in terms of race and the land as a frontier. To some extent, the shifts in thinking among the troops paralleled the changing editorial outlook of the *Oregon*. Yet, the position of a writer in Portland was fundamentally different from that of a soldier in the field. While editorialists communicated a mixture of paternalism and hostility in describing the Filipinos, the soldiers on campaign evinced no sign of the former and gave themselves over entirely to the latter. They saw their enemies sometimes as Blacks, and sometimes as Indians, but their analysis of the conflict was usually the same. In either case, they understood their personal struggle to survive as part of a global, racial struggle for survival and dominance. Often, this led them to embrace the extermination not just of the known enemy, but of the entire native population.

II. The Cuban and Philippine Rebellions

Viewed through the Pages of the *Portland Oregonian*, 1895-1899

The ironies evident in any comparison of the Cuban and Philippine conflicts that border the Spanish-American war are troubling. The Spanish-American conflict began with U.S. protests over the brutal colonial war Spain was waging against the Cuban nationalists. Less than a year later (and only one day after the ratification of the Spanish-American Peace treaty), the United States began a brutal colonial war against Philippine nationalists. This chapter explores how one metropolitan daily dealt with these ironies, and describes the shifts in readers' likely perceptions of America's identity among nations.

The *Oregonian* created a vision of the Cuban Rebellion that promoted close identification between the Cuban cause and the American political ideology. As part of a national phenomenon, this sort of reporting may have helped to spur American intervention in the Spanish-Cuban conflict. The Philippine insurrection against Spain, however, was not given as much attention, nor did the *Oregonian* promote the same

level of identification with the Filipino cause. As America neared its settlement with Spain, and as American designs on the islands solidified, tension between U.S. and Filipino armies mounted, and the *Oregonian's* attitude toward the Filipinos became hostile.

Perhaps more interesting than the changes in the *Oregonian's* perspective on nationalist movements is the evolution of the paper's perspective on the identity of America relative to other nations. In the few years between the Cuban uprising against Spain and the Filipino uprising against the United States, the *Oregonian* shifted from defining American virtue in contrast to European imperialism to defining America as the virtuous inheritor of Britain's colonial mission.

The Cuban Rebels

The attention of American readers was riveted upon the Cuban revolt long before the press took a serious interest in the Philippines. Though the U.S. did not enter the war until the spring of 1898, the *Oregonian* began reporting on the Cuban-Spanish conflict, soon after it began in 1895. By December, as the Cuban insurgents first approached Havana, they were receiving very favorable coverage. Articles and

editorials lent credibility to the insurgent army and to the Cuban Junta's functionaries in New York who spoke for the inchoate state. The rebels were presented as tireless patriots, and their Spanish rulers as oppressive, corrupt, and weak. In many newspaper reports of their military campaigns, a presumption of eventual Cuban victory is clear.

Cuban rebels identified their movement with the American War of Independence, and it appears that their publicists were anxious to promote this idea in the minds of American readers.¹² In the *Oregonian*, the comparison was often repeated. Spain's claim that the rebels were merely opportunists was quickly dismissed. On December 26, 1895, the *Oregonian* printed an account of a Christmas day meeting of the Cuban Junta that included the following quotation from Tomas Estrada Palma, the provisional government's foreign minister:

Spain is trying to negotiate another war loan of 150,000,000 pesetas, and all to crush what she asks the world to believe is a handful of bandits. Spain has sent to Cuba since February 24 nearly as many troops as England did in the entire revolution of the American colonies.¹³

The image that Palma promoted, of Cuban patriots fighting an American-style war of independence, was already being echoed by American journalists before this Christmas address. The following passage, from an article in the *Oregonian* on the

same day, contains an even stronger allusion to the common bond between Cuban and American Patriots:

The poorly fed, half-grown lads, shipped from Spain, are suffering terribly from the effects of climate and the unusual exposure. . . . The Cubans, on the other hand, are animated by a spirit of patriotism, with the all-absorbing desire for Freedom; with the fire which drove the British before the American patriots under the leadership of Washington.¹⁴

These rebels appeared as the modern analogues of American revolutionaries:

ambitious, sincere, strong, and driven by high ideals; the Spanish cause, in contrast, appeared hopeless.

Both articles and editorials confidently described the Cuban force as an army, and its leaders as generals. Writers presented the insurgents as agents of the popular will. Given these perspectives, it is not surprising that editorials called for recognition of Cuban belligerency, and even for official recognition of a revolutionary Cuban state. One editorialist was so confident of Cuban legitimacy and success that he warned, "It is possible that events may move so rapidly that the question of recognition of the independence of Cuba may present itself while we are discussing whether we shall grant belligerent rights."¹⁵ This represents a rather optimistic view of

Cuban military prospects at the time, but, as we shall see, this confidence in Cuban success was common.¹⁶

Oregonian articles reflected an opinion, not only of the justice of the Cuban cause, but also of the physical and intellectual superiority of the Cuban Army over the Spanish one. The Christmas Day headline proclaims, "Christmas in Havana: Cuban Insurgents May Celebrate the Day in the Capital. Campos Has Been Out Generalled."¹⁷ Reporting from Cuba was intermittent and not completely reliable at the time. The newspaper's judgments about conflicting reports show its presumption that the Cubans would prevail. In reference to the same offensive toward Havana, another front-page article discounted conflicting reports that Campos had defeated Gomez's army, claiming that the story "was either unfounded or that the force he had met with was merely a wing of the insurgent army."¹⁸

The Philippines during the War with Spain

One would expect readers of the *Oregonian* to take an interest in the Philippines once it became clear that Oregon Volunteers might serve there.¹⁹ Though there was some

interest in the Philippine insurgents, much less was known about them than about their Cuban counterparts. The newspaper showed the same contempt for Spanish colonizers in the both countries, but the Philippine independence movement was not permitted to assume the same mantle of heroism granted the Cuban the Cuban insurgency. In the days following Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila, there was some initial enthusiasm for the Filipino's aspirations, but as those aspirations ran afoul of America's, the *Oregonian* shifted from lauding to condemning the rebel's ambitions. Whereas discussions of American expansion were largely absent from the dialogue on the Cuban war, talk of new Pacific acquisitions accompanied the first news of war in the Philippines. Especially after the armistice with Spain, and while the final settlement in the Philippines was under discussion, the *Oregonian's* treatment of the Aguinaldo government became more deprecatory. In the days surrounding the ratification of the Spanish-American peace treaty and the outbreak of the U.S.-Filipino conflict at Manila, the *Oregonian's* attitude toward the Filipinos and their independence movement was harsh.

In the same week that headlines announced Dewey's naval victory, the *Oregonian* carried a few articles on the native Filipinos. One short piece reported that "half-breeds at Manila arsenal, who are rebels at heart, cut the cables connecting with

submarine mines,” and thus aided the American attack.²⁰ Another article, which received a small title on the fourth page, reported that when Dewey’s fleet left China, “on one of its ships was an insurgent chief who is to lead the Philippine insurgent forces.”²¹ The language in both reports is telling. For citizens of Oregon in the late 1890s, the words “half-breed” and “chief” would have been closely associated with the history of conflict with the Indians of the Northwest. It is noteworthy that the Cuban military commanders were, from the beginning of the war, referred to as generals, not “chiefs.” One of the images of Filipinos communicated to *Oregonian* readers was that of primitive Indians who, though presently friendly to our cause, were not credible as a civilized nation.

Alongside this image, readers were presented a more promising conception of the Filipinos as worthy understudies of American civilization. On the same page as an article describing Spanish war atrocities against the Philippine natives of Cebu, was a piece with this flattering depiction of the rebels:

The policy of General Aguinaldo, a leader of the Philippines Insurgents, after the islands have been captured, embraces the independence of the islands, external affairs to be controlled under American and European Advisors. Temporarily, at least, the insurgents desire an American protectorate on the same lines as that proposed for Cuba. The scheme includes free trade to the world. . . free press and public utterances, religious toleration.²²

At the beginning of American involvement in the Philippines, readers were presented with these two alternative visions of the insurrection. However, it was the image of Filipinos as uncivilized that would eventually predominate, as it was best suited to America's psychological imperatives as the nation's role in the Philippines changed.

Discussions of America's commercial and territorial ambitions in the Pacific were common in the *Oregonian* during the war. Expansionist and anti-expansionist opinions were commonly aired in the paper during the summer of 1898 as the United States struggled against Spain. However, after the Spanish were defeated, and as the ratification of the peace and annexation treaty approached, all anti-imperialist voices disappeared from the *Oregonian*. The paper took a clear position in favor of annexation, and presented a vision of the Filipinos that complemented this position.

When America had just begun its military operations in Luzon, the dialogue over U.S. expansion was active. On May 3 1898, before troops had landed in the Philippines, an article opined that Dewey's victory would probably lead to America gaining a port and coaling station in the peace settlement.²³ A day later, an expansion-minded reader wrote "how handy" it would be in this war for the United States to have annexed Hawaii already. But an editorial on the same page warned against rising

imperialistic impulses: "Already we are in one of the gravest perils of war—the clamor for territorial aggrandizement. . . . we have no further rightful use of the Philippines than as a base of present operations and a hostage pending final settlement."²⁴ Much like American statesmen at this phase in the war, Oregonians were thinking about naval bases and ports in the Philippines, not about colonial rule. The public dialogue addressed a broad range of options, most of which had previously had a hypothetical character.²⁵

By January of 1899 conditions abroad had changed, and so had the editorial position of the *Oregonian*. The clamor for American rule in the Philippines was continuous, and the opinions of anti-imperialists were either scorned as foolish or condemned as traitorous. Economic arguments for expansion seem to have captured a popular audience, as witnessed by an editorial entitled "The Prize is Ours: Our Asiatic Possessions Mean Wealth for Pacific Coast States." It claimed that the "The struggle for the commercial supremacy of the world is to be waged in Eastern Asia. . . . it is obvious that under the present condition of productive activity here, an export valve is becoming more and more a necessity of industrial existence."²⁶ A few days later, the editorial page carried a quotation from Ernst Renan proclaiming the value of colonies

as a dumping ground for the poor: “A nation that does not colonize is doomed to socialism—to the war of rich and poor.”²⁷

In the second week of February, fighting between U.S. and Filipino troops broke out just as the Senate was nearing its final vote on the peace treaty that would secure Spain’s cession of the islands to America. The conjunction of the two events silenced all voices of moderation, and the *Oregonian* spoke with one clear voice in condemning the insurgents and advocating annexation. The front page of the *Oregonian* included an inaccurate report of the outbreak of hostilities, pinning all blame on Filipino aggression.²⁸ The paper can hardly be blamed for this, as it was simply following the disingenuous account transmitted by General Elwell Otis.²⁹ It is interesting, however, that this event so completely galvanized the paper’s support for annexation. Anti-imperialists, previously given some measure of respect, were now vilified. Attacks on senators who had opposed annexation did not stop short of holding them personally responsible for the attack on U.S. troops. One particularly biting editorial was run with the title, “Our Boys Pay with Blood for Cheap Twaddle”,³⁰ another suggested that the anti-imperialist senators “Hoar and Gorman should be expelled as traitors.”³¹ This editorial assault on the anti-imperialist leaders continued the following day with a rambling attack on the signatories of an anti-annexation

petition. Its backers were derided as foreign agitators, sentimentalists, and effete intellectuals. Hoar's statements before the Senate were dismissed as "the same kind of platitudinous political philosophy. . . characteristic of the Phi Beta Kappa orations at Harvard."³²

In late January and Early February, not a voice was raised on behalf of the Philippine rebels. And yet, the writing in the *Oregonian* reveals a nagging awareness of the charge of hypocrisy that might well be leveled against the United States. If the Cubans, in fighting for their independence from Spain, were accepted as the modern successors of the American revolutionaries, how could the Filipinos be condemned for fighting first to free themselves from Spanish rule, and then to free themselves from American colonization? Americans had long been fond of celebrating the ideology of self-determination that justified the nation's revolutionary genesis. In descriptions of foreign policy, Americans liked to claim the moral high ground in contrast to the corrupt colonial powers of Europe. The conclusion that the United States had abandoned its principles by seeking to conquer the Philippines was so obvious that even the most rabidly imperialistic editorials were compelled to respond to the anticipated charge.

In washing America's hands of the charge of conquest, it was necessary to view the U.S. government as the legitimate government of the Philippine people, and to view the rebels not as national patriots of the Philippines, but as national traitors to the United States.³³ The *Oregonian* covered the Senate debates, quoting expansionist senators whose arguments described the paradigm within which the war would be understood by readers of the *Oregonian*. These hawkish senators relied on the notion that America's claims in the Philippines derived from "the right of conquest under the laws of war."³⁴ This, of course, followed the logic of the treaty itself. The settlement assumed that the people of the Philippines could be transferred from the authority of Spain to the authority of the United States by consent of the two parties. Implicit in this argument was the notion that Spain was the legitimate ruler of the Philippines regardless of the will of the Filipinos. A quotation from Senator Lodge, carried by the *Oregonian*, demonstrated the logic of this perspective: "Those people who have attacked the United States' force are in the eye of international law still subjects of Spain."³⁵ The Lodge argument held that prior to the date on which the Spanish-American treaty went into effect, the Filipinos were Spanish subjects; after that date they became American subjects—though clearly not American citizens. The same article related that "it was said at the State Department, plainly, that Agoncillo [the

foreign minister of the insurgent government] was either a traitor or a spy. If the Philippines are regarded as American territory, then he is a representative and active agent of an insurrection against the United States, and as such a traitor.”³⁶

Though not all of the arguments of the imperialist senators and State Department officials agreed in their particulars, all boldly rejected the idea that Filipinos were entitled to determine their own government. Editorials in the *Oregonian* follow suit. One begins with the patriotic line, “The flag of the United States will never be retired from the Philippines.”³⁷ It then goes on to script Aguinaldo as a traitor to the United States: “Aguinaldo is entitled to no consideration. He deserves punishment as an ingrate, if not a traitor, for he has taken up arms against his benefactor.” The author was responding to the possible objection that “Aguinaldo had virtually won their independence from Spain before our fleet appeared in Manila bay,” and that the United States had intervened to crush a war of national liberation. He was correct in dismissing this inflated view of the insurgency’s prior success, but the logic behind his indictment of Aguinaldo was bizarre. He held him guilty of treason against the United States *because* he was fighting against U.S. rule, but also criticized him for not fighting hard enough against Spanish rule: “Aguinaldo himself, a Benedict Arnold to his own countrymen, had sold out to the Spanish Authorities.” Together, these

statements add up to a claim that Filipinos should be considered traitors for fighting against the United States or for failing to fight against Spanish rule, but not for supporting U.S. colonization.

The Filipinos' June 28 Declaration of Independence, modeled on that of the United States, put Americans in a difficult position.³⁸ It would seem necessary for the United States to either renounce the logic of its own Declaration of Independence or give up its colonial ambitions in the Philippines. An editorial syndicated from the *New York Times* attempted to escape this dilemma by arguing that that the racial and cultural inferiority of the Filipinos placed them outside the logic of the Declaration of Independence.³⁹ It asked, "What does the language of the Declaration Independence about 'deriving their just power from the consent of the governed' mean when applied to the Filipinos?" It went on to ridicule the idea of honoring a plebiscite for independence passed by such a barbaric populace: "In a week the lives and property of foreign residents would be in danger. In a month the islands would be given up to bloody strife." Using a derogatory vocabulary normally reserved for American blacks, the editorialist suggested that the racial-cultural identity of the Filipino revolutionaries made them inherently different from the American founding fathers: "George Washington did not carry a gold whistle as a symbol of his authority. Sam Adams and

Patrick Henry were not prancing blackamors. The American Revolution was not a ‘cake walk.’” The sentiment of the *New York Times* editorialist was echoed by another syndicated piece from the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* which pointed out that Thomas Jefferson was a slave owner and argued that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were never intended to be universal. In his opinion, government by consent should only be the standard among those capable of self-government, i.e., European peoples.⁴⁰

Portland writers were quick to contribute to explanations of why the logic of the American Revolution could not be applied to the Philippines. One lengthy editorial entitled “Consent of the Governed: A Waste of Time to Pay attention to that Theory,” launched venomous assaults on Senator Bacon’s proposed amendment to the peace treaty that would have permitted Philippine self-determination. The author pointed out that in its territorial expansion, the United States had never paid attention to this principle, and that for fools like Senator Bacon, “it would be a waste of time to repeat that the consent of the governed does not mean historically the consent of the governed.”⁴¹ Aguinaldo was dismissed as “simply an adventurer. . . [who] returned thither [to the Philippines] by means of the United States, and is trying to set up a government for his own benefit.”

Several editorials appearing in the *Oregonian* angrily denied the parallels between the American Revolution and the Philippine Rebellion without offering any arguments in support of this position, as though the claim would stand *ipso facto*. One piece claimed that the principle of “no taxation without representation” did not apply to the Philippines and warned that the idea of annexation obliging the U.S. to admit Filipino representatives was “a baseless fabrication.”⁴² The author insisted that the principle of non-entanglement contained in Washington’s Farewell Address had nothing to do with America’s new colonial enterprises.

Aguinaldo himself presented some difficulties for writers advocating the cause of annexation. His status as a former ally, transported to the Philippines by the United States, gave some cause for discomfort. For those favorably disposed toward the Latin American or Greek independence movements of the 1820s, not to mention the Cuban revolt, Aguinaldo might well have seemed an appealing figure. The fact that writers so often insisted that he was *not* another George Washington shows that they feared he could be viewed in that light. Some insisted that an Asian could never be a George Washington, but feared that misguided American leaders were presenting him as such. One writer alleged that, “Senators of the United States have proclaimed him [Aguinaldo] a new George Washington risen upon the world, and have invited and

urged him to resist the United States.”⁴³ In fact, U.S. Senators were not making such proclamations, but this did not prevent tremendous hostility toward the Senators who were suspected of harboring thoughts of political equality with Filipinos.⁴⁴

Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar, elder statesman of the anti-imperialist movement, was a favorite target for hawkish expansionists. An editorial attacking Senator Hoar’s attempt to avert annexation fumed, “And if he then insists that the Filipinos are at present capable of maintaining a real government, we shall be obliged to warn him that he might as well stop talking.”⁴⁵

America in the Image of Britain

As Americans struggled to justify the nation’s conduct in the Philippines, they could not help but compare themselves to Great Britain. In the years before the Spanish-American war, the U.S. gloried in the distinctions between its enlightened foreign policy and Britain’s self-serving one. But as America’s expansionist foreign policy came to resemble England’s, American writers began to embrace the colonial ideology of the mother country.

In 1895, while readers of the *Oregonian* were captivated by the struggle between Spain and Cuba, their attention was also fixed nervously on the tension between the United States and England over Venezuela. Some articles welcomed the approach of war with England, and others dreaded it. More significant, though, was the manner in which the conflict between the United States and Britain gave voice to writers' notions about the fundamental identities of the two nations. Newspaper stories reminded readers of America's special role as the defender of free nations against grasping empires. In December of 1895 one piece proclaimed, "England cannot fight upon this issue. . . . the Monroe Doctrine has been put bravely to a nation of the first rank."⁴⁶ Another asserted that "The principle of American independence of monarchical aggression is one which will be maintained as long as the United States exists."⁴⁷ America was represented as a spokesman for self-determination and for the separation of Eastern and Western hemispheres. It was a self-image consonant with the United States' own origins as a schismatic group of colonies that severed its ties with an Old World empire.

In 1898 and early 1899, as America warmed to the idea of Pacific colonies, an editorial in the *Oregonian* made an interesting case for controlling the Philippines. The piece skillfully resolved one of the embarrassing elements of U.S. claims in the

Philippines. The dilemma was this: If colonial rule was not considered legitimate, America's liberation of Cuba and the Philippines would be justified, but its retention of them as colonies would not be; if colonial rule was acceptable, then annexation of the Philippines would be just, but America's original *causus belli vis* Spain would be suspect. Breaking with American tradition, the editorialist takes the position that colonial rule was not inherently good or bad. America was quite justified in seizing the Philippines provided it would govern them better than Spain. The author considered that England's seizure of Dutch colonies in India brought the inhabitants stability and superior governance: "There does not seem to be any good reason for believing that the United States, following the same line of policy adopted by England in her administration, cannot achieve satisfactory results."⁴⁸

Editorials in the *Oregonian* suggested that America emulate English rule while learning from Britain's past errors. One writer suggested that America employ the British method of conserving resources by ruling through local authorities.⁴⁹ Another writer hoped that the United States would learn from the British experience in the Sepoy Mutiny and avoid provoking religious conflict by reining in missionaries.⁵⁰ Most of the articles in this vein imply that America had somehow come of age and should now join in the colonial work of the mother country:

[the Philippines] were drawn to the United States by a course of events not designed by ourselves. Territorial acquisition was not our object. . . . we found ourselves at war with Spain, drawn to it by moral obligations we could not ignore. . . . Our country became responsible to the world for the preservation of order and protection of industry and commerce of the islands. . . . we shall find, in all probability, no material profit to ourselves . . . but we cannot refuse.⁵¹

With remarkable speed, Americans seem not only to have stopped condemning colonialism, but also to have embraced it as a moral good and a responsibility that they now shared with England.

The *Oregonian* repeated inspirational messages from Britain that lauded America's new mission and emphasized the two nations' shared racial destiny. One piece, reprinted from London's *Spectator*, celebrated that "The dominant fact of the year 1898 has been the rise in the position of the English-speaking peoples."⁵² The author expressed the wish that "the two branches of the English-speaking race, both of them victorious, would join together," while warning that America "must consider the work of governing a strenuous and painful occupation." In an enthusiastic display of Anglophone fraternity, the *Oregonian* printed Rudyard Kipling's "White Man's Burden," followed the next day by a letter praising its artistry and the beauty of its sentiments.⁵³

Clearly, during the five years from the beginning of Spain's colonial war in Cuba to the beginning of America's colonial war in the Philippines, Portlanders came to understand their national identity differently. The *Oregonian* never lost its conviction about America's moral virtue among nations, but it came to define that virtue in a very different way. The young American republic that had once led the world by example alone, was now transformed into a great power that would lead the world by military might and colonial tutelage.

Kipling the Prophet

In the spring of 1899, the *Oregonian* drew inspiration for national expansion from a variety of political, scientific, literary, and religious sources. No individual so completely represented this sense of global mission its writers as Rudyard Kipling. In the first two months of the Philippine War, the *Oregonian* printed eleven pieces on Kipling. His imperialistic themes spoke both to an American sense of racial destiny and to the growing obsession with America's emulation of the British Empire. His

journalistic admirers invested him with tremendous moral authority, and esteemed his writing above virtually all else in the English language.

The same day that the paper announced the outbreak of War at Manila, it printed "The White Man's Burden" as an inspiration to its readers.⁵⁴ A day later, an editorialist gushed over Kipling's genius.⁵⁵ The following day, an adoring front-page portrait of Kipling was accompanied by the headline "Kipling May Be Elevated to the Peerage."⁵⁶ *Oregonian* writers venerated not just his work but the man himself. Anxious articles, keeping readers abreast of Kipling's health and the welfare of his children, appeared on the front page.⁵⁷ Kipling was considered equally edifying to young and old. The "Youth" section of a Sunday paper in March included a lengthy excerpt from one of his children's stories.⁵⁸ Further tribute was paid to Kipling's salutary effect on young minds in a reader's letter to the editor. The letter lashed out in anger at the new public library for offering a book on history that did not adequately express American greatness. Providing some guidance to the library on the proper canon, the irate reader listed nineteen authors that he considered indispensable. Both Kipling and Alfred Thayer Mahan were included.⁵⁹

In reading the *Oregonian's* treatment of Kipling, one has the sense that the paper and its readers subscribed to a narrow view of poetry and literature. Its esteem

for Kipling was less a product of literary sensibilities than of a desire for an intellectual standard-bearer for Anglo-American imperialism. A later editorial proclaimed: "In the name of humanity, Rudyard Kipling is indeed the poet of the hour. . . . He has no peer." Yet, the editorialist soon revealed that his esteem for Kipling had little to do with the quality of the verse. For him, Kipling represented the greatness of English rule and the promise of American colonial rule. He concluded his remarks thus: "England has spent a century and [a] hecatomb of lives of its own sons and of the Eastern natives to whom it has given protection, and America stands at the threshold of a future big with fortunes, and the honor of our own people and of the lands and peoples wrenched from Spain."⁶⁰ Yet even this writer's rhapsodic admiration for Kipling was exceeded by the sermon of a local clergyman printed on the next page. Under the headline 'Kipling's Wonder Words,' the sermon of a local Unitarian minister proclaimed, "Again Kipling has risen to the heights of prophetic vision" in works like "the 'Recessional' and 'the White Man's Burden.'" In a sweeping panegyric, the speaker claimed that Kipling was the standard-bearer of the generation, for Christianity, for the race, and for modern poetry.⁶¹

The Philippines as the New Frontier

Oregonian articles often conveyed an impression of the present war as a crucial chapter in greater process of historical development. The underlying metanarrative was one in which a people, variously identified as “Aryan,” “Anglo-Saxon,” or “White,” were understood to be agents for the transformation of the world through the conquest of the uncivilized.⁶² Sometimes the process was envisioned as spanning from time immemorial to the distant future. However, in connecting the Philippine war to more recent historical experience, *Oregonian* writers described the annexation of the Philippines as a continuation of the conquest and settlement of the American West.⁶³

A July article reprinted from the *Nashville American* described the Philippine war as the next step in a process of westward expansion begun a hundred years before: “The outward movement which started with the Louisiana Purchase was succeeded by the purchase of Florida, the trade with Mexico and the Oregon compromise, extending the domain of these United States.” The writer considered this sequence of events, as not so much a calculated policy but a natural process that “cannot be checked.”⁶⁴ A March editorial communicated the same historical vision, describing the United States’ inevitable absorption of all of the Americas, and continued westward march

across the Pacific. The author advocated the future annexation of the “Anglo-Saxon country of Canada,” and even considered the conquest of less desirable “Spanish-American” countries a logical measure. Though many these dreams were still distant, he rejoiced that “In one direction the manifest destiny idea of the ‘40s has been surpassed by the actuality of 50 years later, for it did not include the Philippines.”⁶⁵

Observers had begun to think of the Philippines not only as a frontier of Anglo-Saxon civilization, but, in more concrete terms, as the continuation of America’s western frontier. In March of 1899, the *Oregonian* printed a letter from Army Paymaster Major Theodore Sternberg to a War Department officer. The headline read, “To Build an Empire/ Many Soldiers Willing to Settle in the Philippines/ Favorable Start for Colonies.” In the letter, Sternberg claimed that at least ten percent of the U.S. soldiers would settle in the Philippines. He pointed to the islands’ rich resources and joined the chorus of other annexationists in rejecting the claim that “White men cannot work in the tropics.” To Sternberg, there was no significant difference between the old frontier and the new one. He advised that, “The only way to Americanize these islands is [by following] the example of American pioneers engaged in making a home for themselves.”⁶⁶ A few pages after Sternberg’s letter, an enthusiastic *Oregonian* article reported that a farsighted group of Oregon

Volunteers “want to stay and mine” and had formed “a committee to develop the mineral resources of the Philippines.”⁶⁷

The *Oregonian* presented the idea that the annexation of the Philippines would re-enact the settlement of Oregon itself. The industrious Americans were simply taking another step to the west. They would fend off claims to the desired territory from other European powers, subdue the indigenous inhabitants, and begin prospecting for minerals and harnessing the region’s agricultural wealth. Eventually, they would remake a new land in the image of their own. It should come as no surprise, then, that Oregonians so often viewed the Filipinos neither as foreign nationals nor as potential American citizens. Like the Klamaths, Modocs, or Nez Pierce, the Tagalogs and other Filipino ethnic groups were seen as Indians who inhabited the land, but had no ultimate claim to it.

Filipinos as Indians

At the turn of the century, Indian wars were still a part of recent memory for Oregonians and other westerners. The Modoc and Nez Pierce wars were only two decades past, and the White citizens of Oregon were keenly aware that their state was

a land wrested from the Indians. In fact, Americans in the West still viewed the small populations of the Indian reservations as barbaric.

In the summer of 1899 an article reprinted from Pendleton's *East Oregonian* described the goings on at a nearby Indian camp as follows: "Out at the Indian encampment last evening, visitors were treated to an exhibition of some of the weird characteristics of the aboriginal tribes."⁶⁸ The people of Pendleton lived right beside the Umatilla Indian reservation, but the cultural boundary was a significant one. They did not view the Indians as Americans, yet they considered the land beneath them to be American soil. These aboriginal peoples were exotic, inferior, and unconnected to the politics of the nation or the relations between nations.

It is significant that Americans described the Philippine War as an "insurrection," because this is exactly how they had described conflicts with the North American Indian tribes. The collection of articles in the March 14 and 15 issues of the *Oregonian* illustrate the connection between these ideas in the minds of American observers. Two pieces on the same page sum up this view. One attacked the voices of "theorists and doctrinaires" who believed that Filipinos could be negotiated with or permitted to govern themselves. The author suggested an approach that mirrored the history of Indian policy in the United States: "The first thing is to drub them soundly.

We are in for the job and cannot back out. . . . when their submission is received, these children of the tropic will be dealt with kindly and justly.”⁶⁹ An article beside it announced the beginning of a new campaign in Luzon. It opined that the experience of the commanding officers was well suited to the task, pointing to General Otis’ experience in the Indian campaigns of 1876 and noting that his command was filled with “such trained and experienced offices, all graduates of the Civil War and Indian campaigns.”⁷⁰ The next day’s paper pointed out how contemporary the idea of Indian war was in 1899. A report from the Southwest warned that “the Indians are becoming restless, and it is said that they threaten all manner of things an outbreak may occur at any time.”⁷¹ On the same page, a report from Minnesota claimed that the “Leech lake Indians are in a dirty temper and ready to start any sort of deviltry,” estimating that the tribe could raise 1,200 armed troops.⁷²

For *Oregonian* readers, Indians, and those abroad who appeared like Indians, did not belong to a civilized community, and were thus not protected by the political ideology or the military conventions that applied to American citizens or the citizens of foreign nations.⁷³ A front-page headline in March pronounced the Filipinos “Worse Than Indians.” The article described an incident in which American troops were fired upon while attempting to parley with enemy soldiers who had raised a white flag.⁷⁴

Stories like this one confirmed the belief that the war against the Filipinos should be carried out with a brutality previously reserved for the suppression of Indian uprisings. A July article presented an interview with a returning American soldier who praised the new groups of U.S. Scouts that fought the “Filipinos Filipino fashion.”⁷⁵ In describing their tactics, the author explained that the new scouts “sneak up Indian fashion” to kill the enemy. *Oregonian* editorials embraced the wholesale application of America’s past military and political approach to Indians to its treatment of Filipinos. Several editorials defined the political status of the Philippines by analogy to previous western territories, and understood the position of Filipinos according to the same metaphor: “When the ratification of the treaty is formally completed, the president will have the same obligation to stamp out the insurrection of Aguinaldo with the armed heel of war that we would have in any other American territory for which no definitive form of government has been provided by Congress.” He suggests that the U.S should follow the precedent of taking the sons of “Native Chiefs” to Washington “in order to educate them by object lessons to [have] respect for and dread of the ‘Great White Father.’”⁷⁶

Theories of Racial Domination and Genocide

Although analyses of U.S. policy in the Philippines touched on issues of economics and politics, the *Oregonian* most often discussed the Philippine War and the future of the colony in terms of race. The same issues reappeared day after day in the paper: the capabilities and defects of the Filipino race, the destiny of the Anglo Saxon race, and the effects of the tropics on northern races.⁷⁷ Each week, *Oregonian* writers and editorialists offered the same answers to the same questions. All voices seemed to agree on the following points: American Anglo-Saxons had a racial destiny and duty to rule the Philippines; the Philippine race was incapable of governing itself; and despite obsolete claims to the contrary, Americans, like the English, could rule in any climate and in any part of the world.

There were some differences of opinion as to the exact course of action dictated by this Anglo-Saxon racial mission. Most believed the Filipinos constitutionally incapable of political life, but some foresaw a slow process of cultural uplift under the competent guidance of American rulers. In the conduct of the war, most writers advocated the application of brutal methods, arguing that one could not succeed in using civilized methods against barbarians. It seemed possible that a stern

and uncompromising process of pacification might lay the foundation for peaceful American rule; thus cruel methods were deemed necessary and ultimately beneficial to the inhabitants, who would soon live in a peaceful and ordered land. Yet, in a significant number of articles, a more troubling vision of America's racial mission appeared— one in which the brutalities of war were viewed not just as regrettable means, but as part of a desired end. These articles described the war as the extermination of an obstinate and inferior people whose interests should not stand in the way of America's.

For some, the racial mission of the United States was also a spiritual calling. Elsewhere in the United States, missionary societies were active in promoting the evangelization of the Philippines. President McKinley even described his decision to seek annexation of the Philippines as something of a spiritual conversion, guided by prayer, and he saw America's mission, in part, as a Protestant mission. Yet Oregon seems to have had a less evangelical character than much of the country.⁷⁸ The *Oregonian* gave little attention to the prospects of proselytizing in the Philippines, but it did present the idea of the United States as a nation with a divine sanction for greatness.

On the freethinking edge of Portland's religious spectrum, the Unitarians turned to Kipling as a prophet of America's mission among nations.⁷⁹ Congregational Minister Arthur Ackerman's sermons, also published in the *Oregonian*, revealed an even stronger sense of divine mandate for American conquest. The *Oregonian* published two of Reverend Ackerman's sermons, the first of which was topped by the headline "Scripture of Expansion." Both sermons repeated the image of America as a youthful nation destined to replace an older order. In one sermon, Ackerman described the decadent civilizations of Asia as ripe for transformation at the hands of "72,000,000 wide awake Anglo-Saxon Americans."⁸⁰ In the next week's sermon, he presented classical and biblical lessons on the tragic consequences faced by nations that lack the will to sustain their aggressive spirit. He lamented that Hektor lingered on the walls with Adromache rather than plunging manfully into battle, and he attributed the fall of the Davidic kingdom to the "failure of expansion under Solomon." His historical lesson ended by challenging his listeners to embrace imperialism: "Coming now to the close of this series with the nation we love on the verge of a new expansion, towering in the full strength of Solomonic splendor, what shall we say."⁸¹

To understand Oregonians' turn of the century discussion of race and expansion, a modern reader must abandon any expectation that the people of the 1890s

viewed race, racial characteristics, or racial competition with distrust or moral ambivalence. At the time, the very idea of race was inextricable wedded to a Darwinian concept of competition and to notions of national exceptionalism and destiny. In the pages of the *Oregonian* during these years, the history of the world was the history of racial competition. A July editorial devoted to minute discussions of the proper nomenclature of English-speaking races began by laying out a premise common to writers of the day: "The instinct of national assertion that manifests itself in racial prejudice is sound and wholesome."⁸² The author insisted that people should rally to their own. A close examination of this editorial reveals some of the historiographic challenges of interpreting commentary on race in sources from the 1890s. Whereas the phrase "racial prejudice" has been a charge of moral failure since the mid-twentieth century, it described a laudable instinct to the Oregonians of 1899.

A sense of racial hierarchy underlies virtually every *Oregonian* piece on Philippine policy.⁸³ Most articles joined the idea of American frontier settlement to the alluring model of British imperialism. The prevailing notion of "Indian warfare" as acceptable against "savages" was bolstered by the conviction that cruelty in the current war would be the foundation of a kinder paternalism in the future. However,

beginning in March of 1899, as Oregon soldiers launched their first campaigns in the field, a new perspective appeared in the *Oregonian*, one that called for genocide.

The *Oregonian*'s war reporting came from official sources, other news organizations, the letters of Oregon soldiers, and the writing of its special correspondents. Two men, Fielding Lewis Poindexter and W.D.B. Dodson, were both foot soldiers and correspondents employed by the *Oregonian*. Their articles show the intersection of the experiences of the Oregon Volunteers and the editorial perspective of the paper.

A week after the Oregon Volunteers' first field campaign began, a front-page headline proclaimed, "All Rebels at Heart/ Extermination of the Tagolo[g]s the Only Guarantee of peace." The article had a practical tone. It suggested that the entire population might be plotting the murder of all Whites, and warned that "the Oriental character is so deceptive" that these homicidal threats were hard to perceive. The article explained that the "English and other residents" believed all members of the Tagalog tribe were committed to rebellion, and implied that the war must therefore be fought not just against the enemy soldiers, but against the entire ethnic population. Moreover, the author believed that the army was on the right track by having insured that "Every hut between the city [Manila] and the American lines is a heap of ashes."⁸⁴

The soldiers' visceral sense of race war found expression in many articles. One entitled "How War Is Conducted in the Philippines," described soldiers' experiences at the outbreak of the war: "Taunted with cowardice, dared and scorned by blacks, the American soldiers had drifted into a mental state that yearned for an opportunity to give vent to Anglo-Saxon valor. . . . Hatred animated every breast for the conceit of the ignorant natives had become so intolerable." The article described the first days of the war as governed by a "policy of devastation" and indicated that even when later orders forbade plunder and needless destruction, they were issued "with reluctance" and not observed by the troops or enforced by the commanders. The correspondent described looting with amusement: "It was comical to see how the boys would get chickens and young pigs notwithstanding" the orders against plunder.⁸⁵

Soldiers' letters appeared in the *Oregonian* in greater numbers beginning in March. They employed the same vocabulary to describe the war that is found in Oregon soldiers' unpublished correspondence. Soldiers spoke of looting as "relic hunting" and of combat as a hunt for "niggers." A March letter described fighting "niggers," hunting for "relics," and even hunting for "live relics."⁸⁶ Headlines above soldiers' correspondence often contained exclamations such as "Shot them Like Coons."⁸⁷

The field reporting of *Oregonian* correspondent and soldier Fielding Lewis Poindexter contained none of the hostility perceptible in the writing of many of his peers. It simply recounted the harsh methods by which the U.S. soldiers prosecuted the war. Reporting from the March advance toward Laguna de Bay, he enumerated the positions captured by the Oregon troops, the casualties, and the destruction of towns and villages along the way. The following passage shows the characteristics of the campaign:

during the chase a village [Taguig] of about 300 houses, many of them containing insurgent stores, was burned. . . . [following an ambush against the 22nd Regulars] it was decided to proceed at once to kill or drive into the lake every native possible to be found in the half moon shaped district . . . between the Mateo river and the end of the lake, a distance of 12 miles. . . . We had been out a week and . . . [had] killed or captured 1000 natives and destroyed, say, 5,000,000 pesos worth of property.”

Poindexter showed some regret at the consequences of the war, but considered these measures to be necessary.⁸⁸

W.D.B. Dodson, whose report appeared in the same paper, seemed less self-conscious about the extreme methods of the war. Aware that some Americans were discussing war atrocities in the Philippines, Dodson protested that instances of medical

care being provided to enemy captives refuted “charges of ruthlessness.” However, the rest of the article described a race war with little compassion. Recounting the details of an infantry advance, Dodson included the following anecdote: “Colonel Egbert . . . when the Oregon boys started . . . said to the boys ‘just watch those d-----d volunteers go for the nigger trenches it is the prittiest sight I ever saw.’ It was beautiful. . . . the blacks could not stop that.”⁸⁹

Manhood and the Cult of Death

Kristine Hoganson, in *Fighting for American Manhood*, analyzes the political discourse surrounding the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. Her approach is to study the rhetorical forms of American politics in order to describe the psychological forces that surrounded policy. She concludes that American men of the era, making their careers in the shadow of the Civil War generation, described the war and the question of national expansion as a referendum on masculinity. The same themes and rhetorical forms that Hoganson identifies in the national discourse appear in the *Oregonian*.

Editorial critics of the Anti-imperialist movement referred to their opponents not as “antis,” but as “Aunties,” stressing lack of proper masculine nationalism. The *Oregonian* was fond of this current in the national debate, delighting in articles from around the country that implicated the intelligentsia in an effeminate foreign policy. A piece reprinted from the Chicago *Inter Ocean* heaped abuse on a Professor Von Holst who had recently suggested that a treaty between Spain and the U.S. could not confer the right to rule the Filipinos without their consent. The *Oregonian* title reads “A Professor’s nonsense/ Chief of the ‘Aunties and His Silly Talk.’”⁹⁰ Two days later, a piece from the *New York Sun* entitled “No Scarcity of Soldiers/ The ‘Aunties’ Powerless To Stop Recruiting for the Army,” rejoiced that, despite feeble protestations against the war, enlistments continued to prove that the “vigor and aggressiveness of youth have not departed the American Race.”⁹¹ This association between race, masculinity, and war was very common in the *Oregonian* as in these other papers. Many of the pieces suggest the same understanding of the historical position of the nation: the United States was described as a virile and expansive power that could only thrive if engaged in war, and only remain healthy to face external threats if the internal menace of feminine pacifism were held in check.⁹²

Local editorials had the same characteristics as those syndicated from other dailies. One March editorial page carried three pieces attacking critics of the war: two railed against New Englanders for seeking negotiation; the third made the familiar argument linking war, manhood, and race: "This is our first actual contact with the affairs of the great outer world. Are we going to flunk at the first encounter. We Shall not, thanks to the Spirit of our race, and thanks to God for our fighting mood! . . . In the career of every virile nation there are times when it must fight."⁹³ In pieces like this, it became clear that the Portland critics of the Anti-Imperialist League did not engage their opponents on the basis of a shared logic. Anti-Imperialists talked about American political traditions; their adversaries at the *Oregonian* spoke of a worldwide contest between races and of preserving the culture of war.⁹⁴ Intellectual arguments were often refuted, not with other intellectual arguments, but with a rejection of intellectualism and a celebration of masculine primitivism. One editorial lauded this new primitivism as revival of the nation's youthful virility: "The Force that Makes History/ Impressive Display of Elemental Instincts in Young American Movement." In the Young American Movement, a cousin to European fascism, the writer saw the dream of Aryan world-conquest:

“The motive of this rush into the army for foreign service is the irrepressible spirit of adventure, the blind impulse to effort outward that drives every vital people like a possession, and that has driven people for a thousand years from its early seats on Norse and Frisian Shores up and down and across . . . four continents . . . The American youth of today are declaring their share in the inheritance of the race.”⁹⁵

The war, then, became a fulfillment of masculine nature, a symbol of American greatness, and part of a centuries-old process of Aryan world conquest.

Some writers considered war categorically good, rejecting all discussions of ethics, and even national interest, as secondary in importance. War was needed to strengthen the race for the great struggle between races and civilizations. One such editorial celebrated “the combative spirit without which none of the great movements of civilization could be carried forward.” The author felt it unnecessary to address the origins or objectives of the war; he saw the war as a matter of national, masculine pride, not of calculation interests: “nearly every company has suffered from the treacherous Filipinos, there is a general desire to stay and make the account even.” He, in fact, praised Americans for seeking to kill or be killed without any understanding of the ends: “These men are of the stamp of men who believe that life has a purpose, even though they may be unable to divine it.”⁹⁶

III. The Observations of Oregon Soldiers, May 1898 to July 1900

Personal and Political Motives of Oregon Soldiers

The idealist and patriotic headlines of the 1898 penny press might lead a modern observer to conclude that the enormous number of volunteers for the war was a product of general enthusiasm for the Cuban cause. Following this logic, one would expect soldiers to have been animated by an ideology of national self-determination and republicanism, and to have been shocked by the mission of conquest assigned to them in the Philippines. However, for the average Oregon volunteer, this was not the case. The early writings of Oregon soldiers (before the outbreak of war with the Filipinos) reveal little interest in the fate of Cuba and little sympathy for the Philippine independence movement. The vast majority of Oregon soldiers enlisted for personal, not ideological motives. They were attracted by the hopes of improving their economic, professional, and civic standing through military service. They were patriots inasmuch as they were committed to the strength and power of the United States, but they were not committed to spreading American ideology abroad.

The soldiers of the Pacific Northwest were men on the lookout for new opportunities. Many were originally mid-westerners who had moved to the West Coast in the hopes of bettering their lot in life. Some were manual laborers, and some were middle class shop-keepers or clerks, but all saw military experience as a chance to save some money for the future, increase their social standing, obtain peacetime commissions, or get the first chance at new business opportunities abroad.

George Newell enlisted with an optimism and naivete that was typical of his peers. Newell was a young man from a family of struggling small landowners who believed that a short tour of duty would bring him and his family new prospects. When Newell enlisted, he wrote to his mother, assuring her that he would be safe and pointing out the likely benefits:

“[the enlistment officer] thought I would rise an[d] get a commishion [sic] if I studied while I am in the army an[d] that he would help me study. . . . I don’t think I wuld [sic] get hurt. I don’t think this regiment would leave this Co[a]st at all in case of war. An[d] if by next pay day there isn[’]t any war I will file on that land. I have a good job now an[d] if there is no war I think I can hold it down untill [sic] I am discharged.”⁹⁷

His letters from the Philippines are filled with promises to send more money home and with schemes to pick up extra income. While stationed in Manila he worked as a barber on the side and was ever vigilant for new profit making ventures.⁹⁸ Just a few

weeks after the capture of Manila, Newell remarked that “this is a rich country an[d] if the U.S. holds it I am agoing [*sic*] to try an[d] get in business here.”⁹⁹

Newell later became something of hero in his regiment, and his commitment to his fellow soldiers and his hostility toward the enemy, once engaged in combat, was intense, but his writing shows no interest in, or knowledge of, the ideological debates surrounding the war. He showed little surprise or interest when the Philippine army replaced the Spanish army as his enemy, and he made little attempt to understand the events of the first week of February, 1899, when the second war commenced. Of the general confusion, he merely remarked that he knew to “put your trust in God and all will come out well.”¹⁰⁰

A year after most of his peers had returned to the U.S., Newell was still looking for new opportunities in the military. In March of 1900 he considered reenlisting in hopes of being promoted to sergeant, and in July he reported to his family, “Well we are going to China to fight the Boxers, we got the order the day before yesterday & will go on board the transport Indinia [*sic*] tomorrow morning.”¹⁰¹ As he departed the Philippines for China, Newell wrote no reflections on the fate of the Filipinos or speculations on the politics of suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. As always, his concerns were practical “I will write again from the Chinia [*sic*]. Well I

have just 2 months from today to serve & I will come home, but if I can get a good job when I am discharged it may be six months before I get home. Well don't worry about me I won't get killed at least I don't think I will."¹⁰²

George Telfer had a far more sophisticated understanding of the war, but his personal calculations were much like Newell's. In peacetime, Telfer was a salesman with an ardent desire to advance his social standing and maintain a respectable middle class home. Telfer believed his position as an officer was vital to these ends. He had a preoccupation with Rudyard Kipling derived in part, it seems, from a vision of himself as a gentleman officer. In categorizing the soldiers, Telfer wrote, "As usual the man from a refined home is the most patient of all. The only trouble we have had is with the country boys—who never knew good homes. We are believers in Kipling's saying the best army is an army of gentlemen."¹⁰³ Yet, Telfer was aware that his status as a gentleman was tenuous at best. Although he sometimes complained about the fraternization of officers and enlisted men—"familiarity breeds contempt"—he was offended when treated as an inferior by officers of higher rank.¹⁰⁴ Telfer frequently calculated his chances of gaining a promotion in the Volunteers or a regular appointment. In his letters home, he described the minute intricacies of staffing and

promotion, exploring every opportunity to use personal connections to his advantage¹⁰⁵.

Telfer devoted just as much thought to other means of advancement as he did to military commissions. His letters included advice to his wife on the proper training and social contacts for the children, and he provided his own advice on social climbing in letters to his son and daughters. He considered the Philippines a promising realm for investments and hatched business plans ranging from sugar and coffee cultivation to canned goods distribution.¹⁰⁶ Without any money to invest, Telfer was sometimes forced to conclude “I don’t think I shall relocate to Manila. At least not until I have returned to America. I haven’t the necessary capital yet.”¹⁰⁷ Though George Telfer was a Lieutenant and George Newell an enlisted man, and though the former was a farmer and the later a salesman, both entered the service with essentially the same plan. They wanted to gain promotion—perhaps a peacetime military position—and accumulate some capital to bring back home or pour into new business opportunities overseas.

Most volunteer soldiers desperately wanted to prove their own valor in war. The adoring crowds that surrounded the volunteers as they departed Portland (and later San Francisco) made a strong impression on the troops, and the Oregon troops were anxious to retain the admiration of communities at home. H.C. Thompson’s

memoir described crowds at Portland's camp McKinley and the doting women that met the soldiers at every train station between Portland and San Francisco. Volunteers paraded through crowds from Camp McKinley to Union Station and, in San Francisco, from the Presidio to the ships that carried them to the Philippines.¹⁰⁸ Soldiers, in their journals and letters home, made proud comparisons between the Oregon regiment and those of other states, and they were quick to point out their roles in victories reported in the press. Many expressed dissatisfaction when not engaged in combat, fearing that others would return with all the glory.

Racial Taxonomies

From June of 1898 to February of 1899, most American soldiers in the Philippines had rather pedestrian assignments. Having arrived at Cavite after Dewey's brief, but mythic, naval victory, the U.S. soldiers spent June and July besieging the Spanish at Manila. The one-day conquest of the city, on August 13, was so swift and bloodless that the Oregon Volunteers were mere spectators to the one significant action against the enemy. In the occupation that followed, U.S. troops administered and guarded the City of Manila, while the Philippine insurgency occupied the suburbs. The relations

between the two armies soon soured, and many American soldiers anticipated the outbreak of war, although a tense peace persisted from August to February. The daily experiences of soldiers during these months were very different from those they later faced in combat. Most of the time, the members of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers were assigned guard duty or municipal administrative functions. Their lives were more like those of civilians soldiers in the field, and their duties afforded them considerable leisure time and permitted frequent interaction with the people of Manila. Diary entries and letters from these months read like the observations of ordinary travelers abroad; they described the customs and conditions of life for people that the writers understood neither as fellow citizens nor as enemies, but simply as interesting foreigners. Along with the predictable accounts about food, lodging, and vice, the soldiers provided what might be termed informal ethnographic commentary. They described, categorized, and evaluated the residents of Manila. This period of early observations provides valuable insight into the Americans' concept of their own racial and cultural identity relative to the Filipinos—before the experience of combat began to color their perspectives.

It would be difficult to overstate the Oregon Volunteers' ignorance of the Philippines before their arrival. Oregon National Guardsmen had been called upon to

volunteer for foreign service the week before the United States' formal declaration of war against Spain, and they were already assembled at the hastily constructed Camp McKinley when news of Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet reached America.¹⁰⁹

As a result, these state militiamen were inducted into the army without any notion of their final destination. Most of the volunteers were in a state of confusion as they were shuffled from Portland to San Francisco, and their confusion continued through several stops in the Pacific en route to their ultimate destination. Aboard the *Australia*, a few days beyond Hawaii, Corporal Chriss A. Bell recorded in his diary a vague understanding of the mission: "It was rumored today that we will first go to the Ladrões about 1200 miles this side of the Philippines [*sic*] and attempt to capture some Spanish gunboats and a town called Guam."¹¹⁰ Many years later, H.C.

Thompson, who served with the Oregon Volunteers, recounted the familiar story of President McKinley searching a world map to find the Philippines on the eve of the war.¹¹¹ Regardless of whether the story is true, it was widely believed, and it expressed a common perspective on the war. The Philippines was an inconceivably distant and exotic land. Just before his departure from San Francisco, Oregon Lieutenant George Telfer remarked, "If we get away on time—we will be the first American troops to cross the sea—and aside from the invasion of Mexico—the first to land on foreign

soil.”¹¹² Few of America’s volunteers had ever been outside of the United States, and they viewed the expedition as not just a personal odyssey, but also a new and exotic undertaking for the nation.

Most American soldiers knew little more about the Philippines upon arrival than they had upon enlistment. The Oregon troops not only lacked equipment suitable to the climate and terrain; they lacked even the most rudimentary knowledge of the land and people. During neither their initial training in Portland, their subsequent training in San Francisco, nor their month-long ocean transit did they receive books, maps, or instruction. A soldiers’ newspaper from Manila, reflected American ignorance of the Pacific: “Now that it has become universally known that there are such things as the Philippine Islands, we may look to see Manila . . . making rapid strides toward the front of the commercial world.”¹¹³ Early correspondence from Cavite and Manila reveals considerable confusion about the unfamiliar land. Nineteen-year-old George Newell was surprised to find that the Filipinos “speak a language of their own” even though “the Country and climate is almost the same as Centrial [*sic*] America, [and] the natives dress and look the same.”¹¹⁴

Both America’s metropolitan newspapers and those produced for circulation among the troops reflected an ill-informed fascination with the people of the

Philippines. The first issue of *The Soldier's Letter*, a newspaper printed for the troops in Manila, was not unlike the travel accounts of distant lands printed in the United States. Its lead article, which described the citizens of Manila, It revealed the difficulties American observers faced in categorizing the people of the Philippines and in understanding them in relation to the other peoples of the world: "the population is heterogeneous, being composed of natives and mestizas ('half-breeds'), Chinese, Europeans and Americans." The article struggled to describe a city that was both sophisticated and primitive to the American eye. Some of the inhabitants of Manila appeared uncivilized while others possessed the charms of a sophisticated urban culture. The American writer presented his own countrymen as both more advanced than the natives and less decadent than the Spaniards. Relative to the "medieval" Spanish colonial order, the Americans were represented as modern; relative to both Americans and Spaniards, the natives were primeval. The article, entitled "The City of Manila" described the old quarter as "medieval" and the new quarter as "just awakening from a slumber of the ages." The same perspective was reflected in the diary of Oregon Corporal Chriss A. Bell, which described Manila's ancient "grandeur," its state of decay, and its "modern speed."¹¹⁵

The *Soldier's Letter* categorized the locals according to civilization:

cleanliness, commerce, order, and race. Here social class seemed to be just as important as race. The author divided both the Chinese and Filipinos by class, describing “those who are groveling in the lowest depths of civilization—(those who merely exist, but have not yet learned to live—such as the ‘coolies’ and illiterate Filipinos),” and also “the wealthy Chinese merchants” and the “educated Philipinas.”¹¹⁶ Confused by the complexity of Manila, both journalists and common soldiers found confirmation for the prevailing cultural theories of their generation. The Filipino primitives were at the lowest rung of a social ladder, lacking all the gifts of civilization. Chinese day laborers received the same low estimate. Higher on the great chain of civilization were the Chinese merchants, the educated (hispanicised) Filipinos, and the Spaniards. But all of these cultural stations were considered transitory conditions on the way to an American future. In a letter to his wife, George Telfer proudly repeated the following comments of a Spanish resident: “You Americans are of the Anglo Saxon race. You are of the coming race. You have whipped us at every point and within 15 years you will confront us in Spain. Nothing can stop you. We can’t. It is destiny.”¹¹⁷ The American troops, who awaited the

conclusion of peace with Spain, saw themselves as the inevitable successors of the Spanish in the project of civilizing the world.

American soldiers, having little knowledge of the Philippine population, categorized its constituents by analogy to the more familiar environment of the United States. To the American eye, Filipinos could seem like blacks, Chinese, Latin Americans, or Indians. Usually, the analogy contained within it an implicit judgment. During the summer and fall of 1898 these comparisons were often contemptuous or paternalistic, but rarely hostile. The Chinese and Spanish residents were measured against the Spaniards and Americans, on one hand, and against the natives, on the other.

Oregon officer Charles Henry Martin was far from charitable in his description of the people of Manila. Industriousness and cleanliness were, to him, the essential features of civilization, and he believed them sorely lacking in the Philippines. In describing the poverty and filth of the city, he claimed that the “worthless natives live about like the Chinese,” but also noted that “the Chinese are about the only people who do any labor here. All the Philipinos [*sic*] are a lazy, shiftless set who would rather steal than work.”¹¹⁸ To Martin, the natives were indolent, the Chinese filthy but hard working, and the Spanish only a bit better: “None of the Spanish contingent here

really know how to live. Perhaps a few of the English may live tolerably well.”¹¹⁹ In order to know how to live, one presumably had study and emulate Anglo-American conduct. He remarked that “when natives eat they look like so many animals.”¹²⁰

Martin’s disdain for foreign customs also extended to Catholicism. In describing the celebration of a feast day in Manila, Martin wrote to his wife that “the priests and all the rest who can afford it complete the festivities by getting drunk. Such is religion as it is understood by the native Filipinos. Undoubtedly you saw like shows in Southern Europe.”¹²¹ Clearly, he believed that those who “know how to live” were not to be found in the tropics of Asia, Latin America, or the Mediterranean, but only in the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant nations of the world. Even while heaping disapproval on the people of the Philippines, Martin was not without humor. In his exasperation over the complex political problems of the occupation, he remarked that “these Spaniards are really our best friends. But the whole affair is repulsively rotten.”¹²² Implied in this comment was an idea that reoccurred in the letters of several American soldiers—

Although the Spanish were the declared enemy in the war, they were, in some sense, our partners in the Philippines. Though less advanced than their American, German, and English cousins, the Spaniards were representatives of Europe, and as such also struggling to spread civilization.

When Spanish forces surrendered Manila to the U.S. troops in August of 1898, they did so, in part, to avert conquest and occupation by the Philippine army that had also laid siege to the city. It was soon widely understood by American troops that their mission had now shifted to the protection of Spanish lives and property. It was widely believed that a lapse in American vigilance would result in the uncontrolled looting of the city by Aguinaldo's troops. As early as the end of August, Martin believed that the U.S. was "almost at hostilities with the insurgents who hate us almost as much as they did the Spanish troops. They were dreaming for months of the gold and riches they would get on the fall of the city + the fun they would have in cutting the throats of their old enemies."¹²³ This notion, that the U.S. troops were now defending the Spaniards against the barbarians at the gates, was widely held. Oregon soldier Albert Southwick recalled, later in August, when the city was taken, "the insurgents expected we would allow them to come into the city and loot the stores and houses."¹²⁴ Though he was far from the fighting and not entirely correct in his understanding of events, George Lemon Newell was sure that on the day Manila was taken, "The rebles [*sic*] an[d] natives begun to pillange [*sic*] and we had to stop them."¹²⁵ Arthur Platts, during the first week inside the walls, reported with some anxiety that, "an attack by natives is feared, so we all sleep under arms."¹²⁶ The American soldiers in Manila, perhaps

especially Oregon Soldiers charged with guard duty, shared the feeling that civilization was under siege. The Spanish—and even the hispanicised Chinese and Filipinos in the city—were now understood as allies against the threat from without.

As middle class officers, George Telfer and Charles Henry Martin considered themselves more educated and sophisticated than the enlisted men.¹²⁷ They, like the authors of the *Soldier's Letter*, attempted to understand the cultural and racial composition of the Philippines according to a global taxonomy. Telfer wrote that there were four distinct races. The Malay, the Spaniard, the Philipeno [*sic*] (mixture of Chinese & Malay) and a light colored race—a mixture of Spanish and Malay.”¹²⁸ Evident in the comments of Oregon soldiers were the influences of the popular theories of the day regarding race, culture, climate, and color. But, in the early days of occupation, praise for the beauty of the people—particularly for women and children—was common. In a letter from July of 1898 George Telfer wrote: “this population is as perfect a physique as any race I have seen. . . . They are quick of thought and action.”¹²⁹ In a later letter, he went further in explaining his emerging notion of Philippine race taxonomy:

I send by this mail two photos—intended to show two types common to Manila. The Mestiza—is a mixture of Spanish and native—usually some Chinese blood as well. The picture shows the dress to perfection—but the face is not as beautiful as some. The Spanish woman has a large, sharp, pointed nose. The Mongolian in the Mestiza shows the flatter nose—making a perfect feature. The other picture shows the Fillipina or Tagal type—from which Mestiza is bred. The Mestiza is very light skinned—but black hair and eyes. The men (Mestizo) are very handsome.”¹³⁰

Before the outbreak of war against the Filipinos in February of 1899, soldiers commented frequently on the pleasing appearance and physical vigor of the Filipinos. Also, as the passage above shows, the soldiers from Oregon had a tolerant eye for the mixing of races. Several Oregon soldiers, including Telfer, remarked on the beauty and sophistication of families in Hawaii and Philippines formed from mixed parentage. From Honolulu, Telfer wrote to his wife describing a local notable in this way: “Mrs. Humphrey is a sister of Mrs. Whitehead—the Chinese lady who married the naval officer and created such a sensation a year ago. Her father was Chinese Minister here. She has some of the look of a Japanese. She is very much a lady.”¹³¹ Apparently, such marriages among military men, though out of the ordinary, were not unheard of. Oregon soldier Arthur Platts spoke favorably of Captain Wilkenson, his Chinese wife, and their son who “looks like any Mexican boy. Very cute.”¹³² The

intermarriages that produced a portion of the urban elites in Manila were approved of in the same light as these military marriages.

Sometimes, the Americans associated superior physical or cultural traits of the Mestizos with the people of China or Japan, even while distinguishing the civilized Chinese and Japanese from the “chino” laborers of the United States. The Americans’ experiences at home left them with an opinion of the Chinese as mysterious people with no regard for what they considered proper standards of cleanliness and order, but they also saw the Chinese as clever and resourceful in business. At the same time, the Oregonians had some notion of the venerable and impressive civilization of East Asia. They drew on an all of these notions in categorizing and describing the Chinese and mestizo populations of the Philippines. Albert Southwick’s letters to his family use a palette of American images to illustrate his understanding of Manila to his family at home: “[there are] business houses that compare favorably with our own at home but the Chinese here have the upper hand. . . . they are not like the Chinese at home and must come from a different part of China. Some are very large over 6ft and well built.”¹³³ While noting their prominent position in the commerce of Manila, Southwick explains that the businesses “kept by the Chinese . . . are dark and dirty like those of

home only more so.”¹³⁴ These he compares unfavorably to the shops of the French and Japanese.

The Americans distinguished between the Chinese engaged in commerce and those that they viewed as common laborers and thus akin to the railroad workers and porters of the United States. Stuart Creighton Miller, in *“Benevolent Assimilation,”* notes that the use of forced Chinese labor by the American military in the Philippines was common.¹³⁵ His claim is corroborated by the papers of Oregon soldiers who express no surprise at the practice. Oregon Volunteer H.C. Thomson described his comrades in the Second Oregon conscripting “Chinos” at gunpoint to carry their supplies.¹³⁶ Even some who made no mention of forced labor believed it something of a caste entitlement to have the Chinese carry their loads. George Telfer remarked with annoyance that “In a country where Chinamen abound and where they carry everything—and where wages are low—it seems absurd to punish soldiers by making them beasts of burden.”¹³⁷ The implication is clear that in the Philippines, as in the U.S., the Chinese were and ought to be beasts of burden.

Visions of the Filipino inside and outside the Walls

The Oregonians' racial characterization of the Filipinos shifted in response to the changing relationship between the U.S. troops and the native population. From the outset, Americans described the Philippine revolutionary army in very different terms than the population of Manila. From the time that the Americans took control of Manila in August of 1898, the Oregon Volunteers, who were usually assigned to guarding the city, regarded the residents as their wards and the army beyond the walls as their potential enemy. Their feeling toward the Manilans was sometimes scornful and sometimes paternalistic, but never hostile. The Oregonians recorded fewer thoughts about the Philippine Army, but when they did so, they described the followers of Aguinaldo as devious and dangerous. Sometimes they were called "natives" or "Tagalogs" in contrast to the "Filipinos" of the city. Still, the most hostile racial characterizations of the Filipinos were not recorded by the Volunteers until they were engaged in face-to-face combat with them. Only then did Aguinaldo's soldiers become "niggers" and "Indians" in the eyes of the Oregonians.

Americans, transported into the midst of the unfamiliar and complex Philippine population, were capable of seeing the inhabitants as African or as American Indians.

It seems unlikely that this is entirely accountable to any morphological similarities among the three populations. After all, at home in the United States, White Americans saw Blacks and Indians as distinct races. American soldiers abroad assigned racial identities, not just on the basis of appearance or language, but also in response to their perceptions of the foreign individuals and to the circumstances of the encounter.

Depending on whether a particular group of Filipinos was seen as modern or primitive, poor or rich, friends or enemies, urban or rural, American observers might assign to them the identity of "Negro," "Oriental," "Native" or "Indian." City people of the same ethnicity might be called "Filipinos" or "Darkeys"; rural people were more likely to be called "natives" or by a tribal name. Most striking, however is the Oregon soldiers' use of the terms "nigger" and "Indian," terms that appear in letters and diaries only after the volunteers entered into heavy fighting. In the thousands of pages of extant personal papers, the word "nigger" is never applied to the Filipinos prior to the soldiers' first experiences in combat, but is frequently the preferred term thereafter. Soldiers used "nigger," like "Indian," to describe their enemies while U.S. troops were engaged in combat, the destruction of villages, torture, or spot executions. Both the narratives and their terminology show a psychological shift for the soldiers, from an attitude of detached observation or casual paternalism to a psychology of race

war. Under these conditions, the common earlier distinctions between combatants and non-combatants disappeared. Both the friendly paternalistic outlook and its very language are lost.

*The Black Filipino*¹³⁸

George F. Telfer

George Telfer's letters are those of a devoted family man. He wrote warmly and frequently to his wife and children, and their welfare was ever present in his mind. During the months of waiting in Manila, he had a kind eye for the Spanish and Filipino families of the city. In July 1898, after dining with a native family, he praised the food and music and remarked that their "manners are enough of the latin race to be pleasing—but backed by greater depth of feeling which makes you like them."¹³⁹ He wrote of his neighbors and of the families that he saw in public places in the same affectionate tone. Though he had plenty of criticism for Spanish administration, commerce, and education, he viewed Spanish families in a different light, maintaining that "Spanish children and Spanish mothers are the same as American children and American mothers."¹⁴⁰

Telfer was fond of quoting Kipling and, in fact, shared the writer's attitude toward the colonized people of the world.¹⁴¹ He was fascinated by the idea of racial characteristics and subscribed to contemporary notions of them. He believed that

Anglo-Saxon peoples had a historical mandate for leadership, but envisioned this leadership as benevolent. Like Kipling, he was fond of the “native children,” even seeking their company as a diversion from his monotonous duties: “One of my sources of amusement are the native children. They are like the darkey babies—only smarter. . . . They have negro features and white teeth. They are musical and catch all the popular airs.”¹⁴² During his months of civil duty, this romanticized yet condescending pickaninny motif appears several times. On another occasion he wrote, “The native children have lots of fun. They are like the darkeys down south—and can make fun out of anything. They stay out doors all day—and play just the same.”¹⁴³

Telfer had begun his military career as a member of the Minnesota National Guard. There he had served in the suppression of two Indian uprisings—a set of experiences that seem to have shaped his later attitude toward war in the Philippines. In his letters from the summer and fall of 1898, he never likened the Filipinos to Indians or referred to his past duties in Indian wars. Then, in mid-January, as tensions between the Philippine and American armies approached the boiling point, he began to analyze the situation through the lens of these past experiences. He became annoyed that, because no official state of war existed between the Filipinos and Americans, the troops were not permitted to engage Aguinaldo’s army: “You know this is one of the

annoying things about our system of government. It was always so with the Indian.

The officers of the army would know that the Indians were preparing for an outbreak—but the authorities at Washington would order ‘hands off’¹⁴⁴

Telfer continued his civil duties in Manila, as a judge-advocate, becoming all the while more frustrated with the situation. He saw in the other men symptoms of ongoing tension and declining standards of humanity: “We still ‘don’t fight.’ We kill a man or so every night, but that is poor satisfaction. The men [on guard duty] are getting so ugly that they use great deliberation when aiming at any person they desire to stop.”¹⁴⁵ Following the outbreak of the war, Telfer continued retained his duties in the city. During this period, he considered the Filipino troops crafty and dishonest, noting that the enemies of one night’s engagement would appear in the guise of friends the following morning.¹⁴⁶ Yet he also noted that in the first battle of the war the “natives. . . fought stubbornly and surprisingly well.”¹⁴⁷ He neither glossed over the faults of the American army nor to demonized the enemy. However, in mid-March, when Telfer’s assignment was shifted from civil administration and guard duty to field command, his attitude toward the war and the Filipinos changed drastically.

In a letter recounting his first day in the field, Telfer reported the strategy and movements of forces with dispassionate precision. On the second day, his troops

looted the area of their deployment with great gusto and an apparently clean consciences: "So we all enjoy life. Yesterday the men went on a foraging expedition and have been living on chicken, eggs ducks and young pigs."¹⁴⁸ On March 20, Telfer and his troops took part in the of Battle Laguna De Bay, the pressure and fear of which seems to have shocked him into an entirely different state of mind. Though he had before likened to an Indian outbreak, Telfer had never referred to the Filipinos themselves as Indians. Yet, somehow, in the strain of battle, the two racial categories collapsed into each other in his mind. Even two days after the battle, he recounted his thoughts while resting after a grueling advance as follows: "I wet my handkerchief and washed my face and cooled my head. Then I considered my chances of standing off any stray party of Indians who might seek to gather me in. I had not used my revolver, so had a belt full of ammunition and decided that they would have a hard time getting me." After rising from this rest, Telfer wrote, "We burned every house we passed."¹⁴⁹

From this point forward, Telfer's tale has much in common with the other accounts that have survived. He and his band of about two dozen men helped to carry out a loosely coordinated campaign to root out the Philippine army and its supporters. They sometimes engaged in battles against regular formations across open fields, trenches, or simple fortifications, but most battles were just brief skirmishes a long

war of terror against the inhabitants of the area. Like the Indian wars with which Telfer clearly associated it, this campaign was not a tidy war of position. It required the intimidation of a large population to prevent civilians from giving aid and comfort to the Philippine Army. When not in battle, Telfer's men displaced villagers and looted their homes, or seized their homes and made them act as servants.¹⁵⁰ Between regular engagements, Oregon troops tried to root out small bands of adversaries in what most referred to as "nigger hunts." Telfer, who never before used the word to describe Filipinos, adopted it to describe his enemies during this campaign. It is clear that his humanitarian standards began to change as well. While he had once been critical of the trigger-happy guards, Telfer's accounts of battles in March and April show no remorse over the enemy dead, or even for battlefield executions: "I remember jumping trenches—seeing mangled bodies, writhing figures, and hearing groans everywhere. But through it all but one line of thought was in my mind—'Guide right.' 'preserve touch.' 'Advance' 'Lay Down' 'Forward'—'Kill' 'Kill'—'Take no prisoners.—Then dropping—out of breath and panting.'"¹⁵¹ The fear and confusion of battle is palpable in his letters, but these battles seem to have left him psychologically transformed. Even in moments of relative safety, Telfer retained his desire for a war or extermination. His cynical amusement with the project is chilling. In a letter to his

wife, Telfer described his daily routine without apology: “We perform no duty during the day—but put out pickets at night. Scouting parties are made up from volunteers—every now and then. It is great fun for the men to go on ‘nigger hunts.’ The air would be delightful were it not for the odor from dead niggers which have been left unburied. . . . We received some Krg-Jorgenson [*sic*] rifles today. So now we can reach Mr. Nig. at his own distance.”¹⁵²

Albert Southwick

Albert Southwick, a private in the Second Oregon Volunteers was a prolific correspondent to his mother and sisters. Like George Telfer, Southwick describes the residents of the Philippines in relation to racial groupings that were familiar to him from the United States. Southwick did not share Telfer’s early fondness for the children and families the Philippines, but he was by no means hostile to the Filipinos at the time of his arrival. Southwick’s racial classification of Filipinos, like Telfer’s, changed in response to the relationship between the U.S. forces and the occupied population.

In his first encounter with Filipinos, Southwick’s attitude was neutral, and he classed them among Asian races. Even before disembarking in the Philippines, he set

down the following observations: “The natives are all around the ship this morning in their canoes trying to sell their fruit chickens and eggs. . . . they look a good deal like chinese only darker.”¹⁵³ From the deck of the ship, Southwick observed the efforts of the Philippine insurgency against the Spanish citadel with interest, but without perceptible sympathies in the contest, “The insurgents are busy here alright they have been burning the outlying part of Manila for some time. . . . they have an engagement every day with the Spanish troops.”¹⁵⁴ Only following the U.S. capture of Manila and amidst the disputes over zones of occupation, did Southwick develop a hostile attitude toward the Filipinos. As his attitude changed, so did his racial classification of the Filipino. His original notion of Filipinos as “like chinese” was replaced by a notion of Filipinos as Black. Following his first mention of minor scuffles between the Philippine and American forces, Southwick revealed this shift in his thinking when he announced that, “next time they get into a fight there will be quite a funeral of black men.”¹⁵⁵

Throughout the fall of 1898, Southwick’s letters devoted little attention to the insurgents. One entry showed both contempt for the Filipinos and the conviction shared by many of his fellows that the native forces were lingering beyond the gates because their chief desire was plunder: “The insurgents expected we would allow

them to come into the city and loot the stores and houses.”¹⁵⁶ Nonetheless, with few major conflicts between the two armies during the fall, Southwick never again gave voice to his early predictions of a “funeral of black men.” During these months he generally wrote of other subjects all together, and when he did write of the Philippine soldiers, he described them as “natives” or in military terms such as “insurgents.”

In January, during the same weeks that Telfer described the growing anxiety and bellicosity of the guards, Southwick returned to his reflections on native character: “The natives still keep up their reputation for treachery, and have knifed two sentries this last week; but there were two Filipino funerals as a consequence.”¹⁵⁷ With the outbreak of war in February, Southwick’s correspondence focused almost exclusively on military matters. He saw combat sooner than Telfer did, but it seems to have affected the same sudden shift in his racial characterization of the Filipinos. In his first account of battle, Southwick referred to Filipinos as “niggers”—a term he had never used before, but often used thereafter.

In the midst of combat, Filipinos, whether they were enemies under arms, the wounded, the dead, or civilians, no longer looked to Southwick “like chinese,” as they had eight months before; they were all now “niggers.” Upon first seeing the enemy dead up close, Southwick noted without further comment: “found 2 wounded niggers

and 7 dead ones.”¹⁵⁸ In the entries that followed, it becomes clear that Southwick came to believe all Filipinos were enemies and that all were “niggers.” He noted with disgust that he and his companions kept finding “niggers” who claimed to be “amigo Philipino [*sic*].”¹⁵⁹ The American soldiers treated them as enemies, heedless of protestations to the contrary, and either executed them or used them for forced labor. He mentions that the mobility of field artillery positions was enabled by “the Hoskiss [Hotchkiss field gun] being hauled by a lot of ‘nigger’ prisoners.”¹⁶⁰ Southwick’s men made a general attack on all people and property within the area of their military operations. The following passages are typical: “the ‘nigs’ were so well hidden and using smokeless powder, it was almost impossible to find any of them, but we filled the trees full of lead. . . . we sent a shot into every clump of bush and houses, thick leaved trees, or anything that looked like a place for a ‘nigger’ to hide.”¹⁶¹ It is clear that Southwick often feared for his life in the heat of battle, but it is also clear that he enjoyed certain aspects of war. Among his favorite activities were what he called “nigger hunting,” “foraging,” and hunting for “curios” and “relics.” By these terms, he meant tracking down and killing Filipino enemies and looting the area for food, drink, and valuables.¹⁶²

In war, Southwick considered his enemies black, savage, and undeserving of the normal protections of civilized treatment. His racial classification of the Filipinos appears to have been shaped by his position in the conflict. It is noteworthy that Southwick, like most other Oregon soldiers, had seen the Hawaiians as a beautiful and capable people, in the context of their warm reception of Americans in Honolulu: "Natives. . . are much better looking people than I expected and seem be quite intelligent."¹⁶³ Southwick had not associated the Hawaiians with Africans, just as he had not judged the Filipinos whom he met in June of 1898 as blacks. Southwick's desire to understand friends as more civilized and his enemies as more savage is so pronounced that U.S. military cooperation with the Macabebes in the spring of 1899 required him to introduce some subtle ethnographic distinctions. In explaining the situation to his family he first wrote, "there are several distinct tribes on this island. Only one of which [the Tagalogs] are connected to this insurrection." These are the enemies that Southwick considered "niggers." The Macabebes, who were hostile to the Tagalogs, and whom the U.S. was now using as scouts are now redefined by Southwick. Later, he remarked with approval, that "one tribe, the Macabebes, which is probably the most civilized," have joined the army of General Otis.¹⁶⁴ This is a fascinating reassessment. Before the outbreak of hostilities with the Philippine

independence movement, Southwick followed the usual convention of associating civilization with urbanization and westernization. By this standard, the Tagalogs, who were the largest Philippine ethnic group in the city of Manila, would have seemed the most civilized. Yet, as enemies, Southwick came to regard them as barbarians, even while seeing the Macabebe tribesmen as a promising, “civilized” group.

Chriss A. Bell

Corporal Chriss A. Bell of the Oregon Volunteers was an educated young man who planned to return to Oregon and enter the legal profession after the war.¹⁶⁵ His diary recorded the whole period of his service, from the time of the *Australia*'s arrival in Guam in June of 1898 to the time of his departure for home a year later. At the beginning of his deployment, Bell's ideas about the racial identity of the Filipinos were still fluid. His social contacts outside American circles in Manila appear to have been far broader than those of his fellow soldiers. During the early occupation of the city, he remained open-minded about the people of the Philippines, making his observations on the basis of his own individual encounters. Bell had trouble defining the race of Pacific islanders early in his travels, and his first descriptions of the Filipinos and the Philippine army were not dominated by the idea of race. Later in the

war against them, Bell described all the inhabitants of the war zone as “savages” or “niggers.” But before going into combat, Bell had showed some concern for the welfare of the population in combat zones. During his final months in the Philippines, Bell recorded his conviction that the barbarism of the enemy required and justified a total assault on the general populace.

Before reaching the Philippines, Bell recorded the following observations on the Hawaiian natives: “the Kanakas are lazy good natured folk not unlike our Indians or a cross between an Indian or Negro.”¹⁶⁶ He found them attractive and pleasant, but also believed them to “have no morals.”¹⁶⁷ Bell had a similar response to the Filipinos—he saw them as simple people, still in their moral childhood. His comparisons to American Blacks and Indians placed the peoples of the Pacific in the racial category of uncivilized peoples that should be governed and protected as subjects, but not treated as citizens. Controlling them, he came to believe, would require harsh treatment.

While stationed in Manila after its capture, Bell recorded more comments on Spaniards than Filipinos. Like George Telfer, he made social visits to affluent Spanish families, and had a soft spot for the children of the town. After several such visits, he remarked in September of 1898, “There was a number of young folks from babies up.

Had a pleasant time especially with the boys and girls.”¹⁶⁸ His attitude toward Spaniards was warm, but he seems to have viewed them as a people in decline. The language he used to describe all things Spanish communicated a sense of decadence and degeneration. He praised the architectural works of the Spanish, even while noting that “There is a general air of ancient grandeur gone to decay.”¹⁶⁹ Likewise, he observed that “Once in a while are seen a Spanish woman that is very handsome but they seem to decay early.”¹⁷⁰ Though he had no high regard for the Spanish army as a fighting force, Bell found that they were “decent fellows and treat us fine.”¹⁷¹

During the summer and fall of 1898, Bell did not describe the Philippine Army in racial terms, but he held its members in low regard. After noting the Spanish troops’ disdain for the insurgents, Bell remarked, “I do not blame them, for a dirtier, lower, more disgusting lot of fellows I cannot conceive.”¹⁷² Bell came to regard the insurgents as an incompetent fighting force, but he still described the emerging conflict between the U.S. and Philippine armies in political or military, rather than racial, terms. The week before the war broke out, he continued to describe Aguinaldo as an enemy military leader with a poorly organized force. Bell’s diary entry expressed his belief in “Aguinaldo’s hopes of settling difficulties without bloodshed” while attributing ever-more dangerous incidents to the fact that “The troops near the

[state of] Washington boys are not Aguinaldo's personal force, but under another insurgent leader. He wishes to fight & it seems difficult for Aguinaldo to hold his own."¹⁷³

When the war began, Bell was a fairly even-handed observer. He judged the relative strengths and weakness of the two armies, and found the American force far superior, yet his comments show no sense of racial hostility. The following tactical observations are typical of his commentary. In the first days of the war, he wrote: "The natives are but poor fighters and do not understand our style of charging under fire."¹⁷⁴ Though Bell held the enemy army in contempt, he was concerned for the welfare of the populace. He described the first American advance thus: "Natives were killed by the hundreds. They did so much shooting from the bamboo huts that an order came to fire the huts as the men advanced. This was done & men, women and children suffered."¹⁷⁵ Bell was also concerned by the callous treatment of Filipinos in Manila as the war began, noting, "In [the] evening two natives were shot within 30 feet of me apparently [there was] no cause as neither of them had any sort of weapon."¹⁷⁶

In Hawaii, Bell had thought of the natives as somewhere between "our Indians" and "negros." Standing duty in the city of Manila as the war began, Bell was a distant observer to the Army's destruction of Filipino villages, and he tended to see

the victims more as Indians than as Negroes. He used the term “natives,” in most cases, and had some concern for the treatment of non-combatants, though little for the enemy army. He viewed the Philippine army as “savage” and nearly beyond the control of its officers. In a February diary entry, he told the story of “An incident. . . which showed native character.” Philippine soldiers apparently fired on an American general’s delegation that was approaching a Filipino general under flag of truce. Bell recorded that the “native general” was “forced to admit that his men were untamed savages without the first principle of humanity and apologized for being a part of such a disgraceful affair.”¹⁷⁷ Bell thought of the armed Filipinos as unpredictable and savage, but he described civilians differently, he believed they were entitled to reasonable protection against the ravages of war.

By April, Bell had been subjected to tough combat conditions, and his attitude had hardened. Though he had once worried about the fate of the local population, he now wrote that the Filipinos “have caused so much trouble & murdered so many of our boys that that they [U.S. soldiers] recognize them no longer but shoot on sight all natives. Natives will not or cannot understand kind & civilized treatment. If you treat them as equals they will think you are afraid of them & murder you.”¹⁷⁸ He justifies the abandonment of ordinary codes of war on the grounds that the natives fought

“contrary to all civilized warfare.”¹⁷⁹ By May, Bell had been through terrifying combat experiences that cemented his sense of racial hostility. His reports of battle casualties reflected this new outlook: “About 700 niggers attacked MacArthur in the forenoon. . . . there were about 100 niggers killed and wounded.”¹⁸⁰ Bell’s diary entries show the connection between intense, visceral fear and race-hatred: “[they] warned us the gugus were in front. . . the gugus opened fire their aim was poor. . . We could see but few gugus though they could see us and as we came through the field the range was good and bullets whistled all around. . . . [I] was sick to my stomach & puked but would rather have been shot than quit.”¹⁸¹

Willis Arthur Platts

Willis Arthur Platts left behind a diary with entries spanning the whole year of the Oregon Volunteers’ deployment in the Philippines. Like Chriss Bell, Willis Platts came to the Philippines without any detectable sense of racial hostility toward the inhabitants. He had a tolerant view of intermarriage between Americans and Asians, and he never employed hostile racial language until he was in the thick of combat for

the first time.¹⁸² Like Bell, however the experience of battle produced a radical change in his notion of the moral boundaries of warfare and in his sense of race.

At the time of his arrival in the Philippines, Platts described the inhabitants' physical characteristics, but without attempting categorize them in relation to any racial schema. In July of 1898, he wrote that the Filipinos were "small and very dark, [and] wear very little clothing," but he did not employ the race vocabulary of the United States.¹⁸³ To describe the inhabitants of Luzon, Platts used the words "natives" and "Filipinos" interchangeably. He sometimes described the Philippine army in strictly military terms as the "insurgency" of the "Philippine Army;" at other times, his use of the word "natives" seems to emphasize their primitivism.

As an observer to the battles surrounding Manila in early February, Platts believed American brutality was warranted by the Filipinos' violations of civilized conventions of warfare: "They say our boys raised the cry of no quarter ([I] am glad of it) and disregarded the numerous white flags because of many treacherous deeds."¹⁸⁴ Though Platts was unconcerned by battlefield executions of enemy soldiers, he was initially disturbed by the widespread assaults on civilians. A few days later, he noted without concern that "Nearly all of the Regts are foraging now, have chickens, pigs and anything else they want. . . [they take any] carriage that they see and make it their

own, houses and buildings are looted and burned as they go. . . . every native carries a pole with a white flag on it.”¹⁸⁵

By the end of the month, Platts found himself in the midst of the kind of warfare that he had criticized from the walls of Manila. In the first description of his own experiences with “street fighting,” Platts appears to have abandoned all moral distinction between the killing of male combatants and non-combatants, but he shows real remorse for the death of women and children:

“[We] would fire into a house and when the natives would run fire at them and generally they tumbled. Fired each house after we had looted it and driven the women and children back. . . . Grover Todd and myself fired about 8 shots into the bottom of a hut about 3 feet from the ground then ran forward and breaking open the doors rushed in to find 2 men and 3 women all unhurt. They had lain flat and the bullets had passed through am glad now that they did. . . . before the fight was over had to witness the painful sight of many women shot.”¹⁸⁶

Platt’s diary entries from combat zones show a steadily deteriorating concern for the welfare of the Filipinos, despite the fact that he was initially more anguished by the commission of atrocities than were many of his comrades.

Platts did not describe his first battles as race conflicts, but his accumulated combat experiences wore down his original sense of war ethics. His entries became

increasingly callous with hard experience. At the end of the day described above, Platts concluded “estimates of the day’s work are natives lost killed and wounded 150. Amer. 2 killed and 4 wounded, near 1000 native huts burned and a good time for all.”¹⁸⁷ It is noteworthy that his combat statistics in no way distinguished between enemy soldiers and common Filipinos. From this point forward, Platts began to describe killing Filipinos in the same terms he used to describe killing animals for sport. Working in coordination with boats crews armed with Gatling guns, Platts and his comrades moved north from Manila toward the enemy capital at Malolos, “killing and burning all we meet.”¹⁸⁸ He remarked frequently on the good fun had by the Oregon soldiers: “All the boys are contented and happy. . . . killed a couple hundred ducks and chickens today.” The soldiers spent their free time looting, swimming, and shooting at dogs and birds for sport.¹⁸⁹

Though increasingly hardened to combat and inured to violence, if not amused by it, Platts only developed a racial conception of the struggle late in his tour of duty. In mid-March, after surveying a field of wounded and dead enemy soldiers, his commitment to total war crystallized: “After seeing this I can have no pity for the natives.”¹⁹⁰ True to his word, Platts never thereafter betrayed any thought of compassion for the Filipinos. The shift in racial categorization observable in other

soldiers' papers appeared in the next entry of Platts' diary: "niggers attempted to cross the bridge but was met by a terrific fire from Lieut. Kelly's Platoon."¹⁹¹ Following the route at the bridge, Platts reported that "The boys of our little camp were so encouraged about it that they scattered out and burned every house anywhere near and whenever 'an amigo' showed up generally put him to sleep. . . I know of quite a number they killed, even shot at many myself."¹⁹² Platts' attitude toward the Filipinos was, by the end of his service, very different from what it was at the war's beginning. By April, the "natives" had become "niggers" and even those who proclaimed themselves "amigos" were really enemies. He considered all villages reasonable targets of the war, and believed that anyone fleeing from a burning home could and should be shot.

Joseph G. Evans and Elliot Rodgers

The extant personal papers of some Oregon Volunteers are very limited and provide only a fragmentary portrait of their year in the Philippines. Yet, these accounts also conform to the patterns noted in more complete diaries and collections of correspondence. They suggest that soldiers under combat conditions developed an idea of the U.S.-Philippine war as a racial struggle. Soldiers' descriptions of the race of their

adversaries became more definite and more hostile, and this change was accompanied by an increased acceptance of brutality against enemy soldiers and civilians.

Joseph G. Evans' few extant letters illustrate the sharp contrast between his first impressions of the Filipinos during their struggle against Spain, and his notion of them during their war against American annexation. Early in the fight against Spain, Evans described the American capture of a Spanish force and the release of Filipino sepoys with some approbation for the character of the native people: "The 150 native soldiers were released as they were friendly and of a peaceable turn of mind, and in order to show their love for a nation that has ruled them with an 'iron hand,' as soon as they were freed, the native soldiers tore their buttons and other insignia of rank from their clothing."¹⁹³ In the summer of 1898, describing the Filipinos as a decent and mistreated people, Evans was not particularly concerned with their race. However, a year later, while fighting against them, Evans' writing emphasized the race of his adversaries in almost every sentence. He recalled that the Washington Volunteers were "chasing the niggers till they had them cornered at the water's edge. . . . the niggers call the Springfield's, piccaninni cannon. . . . the Springfield wound is generally a dead nigger."¹⁹⁴

Oregon soldier Elliot Rodgers left behind a journal of his combat experiences in April and May of 1899. Because the diary contains no earlier entries, it is not certain what his attitude toward the Filipinos was prior to combat. However, this diary of the spring campaigns provides valuable information about his thoughts on race during the fighting. Rodgers placed the enemy in the same category as American Blacks. His descriptions of battles combined military and racial terminology, sometimes shifting between the two lexicons mid-sentence: “the insurgents has [*sic*] some big guns but do not know how to use them. The negroes fell back and the brigade took the town.”¹⁹⁵ In another instance he recounted the casualties as follows: “The Coons attacked the Kansas regiment. . . . The Mon. + Kan. Regiments went after the coons and killed about 100 and captured 30.”¹⁹⁶

The racial distinctions made in Rodgers’ writing show that his understanding of a man’s race was determined by context and relationship more than by appearance, language or custom. To Rodgers, a “Coon” or a “negro” was, by definition, an enemy. This becomes especially clear in his description of the enemy soldiers as “Negroes” in contrast to friendly Filipinos whom he does not view as black. Consider the following description of the Philippine Army’s attack on the town of San Fernando: “The report here is that the Negros killed a 1,000 Philipinoes [*sic*] + Chinese and threw them into

the church before setting fire to it.”¹⁹⁷ Somehow he was able to view pro-American, Chinese-Filipinos as “Chinese,” and pro-American ethnic Filipinos as “Philipinoes,” but in Rodgers’ mind, those hostile to the U.S. occupation became “negroes.”

The Filipino as Indian

The Oregon Volunteers with combat experience had gained it in Indian wars. Between the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of the Spanish American war, the only significant U.S. military actions had been against Indian tribes in the West. Though a few aged officers in the Spanish American and Philippine wars were Civil War veterans, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers in the regular and volunteer armies were men of a younger generation. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that America’s western wars against bands of Indian irregulars, fought to assert U.S. sovereignty over indigenous peoples, would guide Americans’ understanding of the Philippine War. It is surprising that so many soldiers identified the enemy as “negro.” This notwithstanding, the vision of the Filipinos as Indians and of the war as “Indian war” exercised an important influence on the Oregon soldiers.¹⁹⁸

Edward E. Kelly, a law school graduate and former telegraph operator from North Dakota, having volunteered in the Midwest, was probably assigned to serve with the Oregon Volunteers because of his technical expertise.¹⁹⁹ A special feature in the *Chicago Sunday Chronicle* lauded Kelly's technical feats in battlefield cable communications and presented an interview with Kelly on the course of the war and the future of the Philippines. Kelly was just as clear in identifying the Filipinos with Indians as other soldiers were in identifying them as Blacks. As a member of the North Dakota militia, Kelly's past outlook on U.S.-Indian relations seems to have provided him with a blueprint for understanding the war in the Philippines.

Kelly's description of the enemy might just as easily have been applied to a number of Indian adversaries of previous decades: "The Tagalogs are warlike, but they are also primitive and have had enough of us." Kelly was confident that America was prevailing in the conflict, but cautious about the prospects for a stable peace: "[Kelly] is of the opinion that the backbone of the uprising has been broken, but does not hope that native tribes will accept civilization with reasonable speed if at all. He looks for years of predatory warfare like those which formerly raged on the borders of the United States with the Red men."²⁰⁰

Edward Kelly understood the Philippines as a frontier territory of the United States and the inhabitants as primitive Indians, resistant to the inevitability of American sovereignty, and too uncivilized to trust or enfranchise. He considered the natives “lazy, savage, and little inclined to adopt new ideas. They would rather remain as they are than to improve.” For Kelly, the essence of historical improvement was assimilation into American culture. Even the fact that the Filipinos had not adopted American dress in the course of the war was, in Kelly’s eyes, an impediment to their ascent from savagery. Having defined the Philippines as a frontier territory and the Filipinos as natives, Kelly recommended an administrative policy modeled on the American reservation system and a military policy based on Indian wars: “I am satisfied that it will be many years before any striking change will be noted. We are facing the same condition over there that we faced on our own frontiers for so long. The same treatment will be needed to train the Filipinos to the habits of civilization.”²⁰¹

Lieutenant George Telfer’s past experience suppressing Indian uprisings informed his perception of the standoff between the American and Philippine forces in January of 1899. In January, Telfer analyzed the situation in the Philippines by conscious analogy to American Indian wars.²⁰² However, once personally involved in

the fighting, Telfer's identification of Filipinos with Indians seems to have become less conscious. In March, during a break in the fighting at Laguna Bay, Telfer worried about his "chances of standing off any stray party of Indians."²⁰³ When he saw enemies face-to-face, he called them "niggers," but unseen attackers from the jungle he called "Indians."

Even young soldiers who had never fought in Indian wars drew on the experiences of their elders. George Newell, who was only nineteen when he enlisted, absorbed the idea of the conflict as "indian war" from his superiors: "General Otis [Otis] expects to subdue the insurgents before long, but I think it will take 2 or 3 years. . . . I have heard officers say that this is the worst Indian fighting they ever seen."²⁰⁴

For some, the association of Filipinos with Indians derived from past experiences in war. Yet, this analogy seems to have other roots as well. For Americans from the Western United States, Indians were people under American authority, but outside of American civilization. Indians represented all things uncivilized and external to the American culture. George Telfer, who so revered Kipling, saw America as a partner in a great Anglo-Saxon project to civilize the world. Charles Henry Martin had a similar perspective. To him, America's conflict with the Spanish was a sideshow to the broader European objective of civilizing the world. In this global project, the

Spanish were just incompetent allies, while the Philippine nationalists were the real enemy. In August of 1898 he wrote, "The Spaniards are really our best friends. . . . the natives have no single virtue to redeem them. They are infinitely lower and viler than our indians."²⁰⁵

A curious coincidence noticed by most of all the members of the regiment was that a fight was in progress very near the same spot where the insurgents were attacking the Spaniards the hour the first expedition entered the harbor. The antagonists were changed. . . . Oregon hearts since stilled by Filipino bullets, beat with sympathetic and eager feelings, were now on the eve of the regiment's departure, more stubbornly fighting their erstwhile friends. . . . At each shot the boys would ejaculate: 'the niggers are getting it. When the same men heard the roar of old muzzle-loaders in the hands of the Philipinos fighting the Spanish they said: 'give it to the greasers.'

—*Oregonian*, July 17, 1899

IV. Conclusion

Both the Oregonians who fought in the Philippines and those who merely observed the war through the press expressed similar ideas of America's historical identity and global mission. To soldiers and readers alike, the Philippine war became a fulfillment of America's racial destiny to expand westward, claim the world's wasteland's for civilization, and pacify or eliminate less capable peoples who stood in its path. Young Oregonians, removed from their already mythic pioneer predecessors by only a few decades, reapplied elements of the familiar frontier narrative to this new national

undertaking. Yet, as the story was reworked to suit the needs of the present, new elements were added to it.

While the United States vied with European empires for greater influence in distant lands, Oregonians redefined themselves as both uniquely American and as proteges of Great Britain. The patriotism that emerged from these sources was both national and racial in character, but bereft of political ideology. The idea of America as uniquely graced by its republican doctrines was ill suited to the conquest of distant peoples. The American psyche resolved this dilemma by rejecting the notion of America as a great political entity and replacing it with the notion of America as a great racial entity.

The concept of the U.S. military expedition as a racial project took hold in the winter of 1898 as the Filipino enemy replaced the Spanish one. Americans invented themselves as Anglo-Saxon conquerors while increasingly characterizing the Filipinos in racial terms. Americans defined themselves as a people who conquer and govern; they defined the Filipinos as a people incapable of civilization and political life.²⁰⁶ Americans believed themselves a race entitled to protection under European codes of war and law; Filipinos were placed outside the umbrella of these protections. Often the soldiers and reporters described the enemy as Indians—a vision very much in keeping

with the notion of the Philippines as an unsettled zone, analogous to the American frontier. Yet, just as the notion of frontier merged with the notion of colony, the image of “Indian” merged with that of “nigger.” This habit of mind created a sense of continuity between the racial characteristics of the war and the history of the nation. If some nagging awareness of the contradictions between American political traditions and the current war emerged, it was quickly banished by the understanding that American historical praxis had excluded non-White peoples from membership in the polity. This colonial war was not so much a renunciation of America’s republican ideals of social contract as it was a continuation of America’s belief that the application of all such ideals should be qualified on the basis of race.²⁰⁷

The changing circumstances of America’s military activity in the Philippines during the year that the Oregon Volunteers served were difficult to understand and difficult to justify. Both the soldiers and the *Oregonian* writers responded to the shifting diplomatic and military circumstances by adjusting their understanding of the racial relationship between Americans and Filipinos.

As distant observers, the *Oregonian* writers were initially able to consider different courses of action in the Philippines as hypothetical. Though the paper was never strongly sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Philippine Rebellion

against Spain, voices in the *Oregonian* did at first describe the nationalists in political terms. While America was still engaged in the fight with Spain, the *Oregonian* sometimes likened the nationalist rebels to primitive Indians and sometimes accorded them the status of political actors. This uncertainty in the characterization of the Filipinos was paralleled by an uncertainty in the description of America's political identity. Some editorial voices continued to oppose annexation on the basis of America's republican and anti-colonial tradition; some advanced realist arguments for expansion based on commerce and national security, and others connected the prospects for annexation to the race mission of America. However, once Spain was defeated and national policy had moved toward annexation, editorial appeals to America's revolutionary heritage ceased. The *Oregonian* took up the idea of Anglo-American empire with enthusiasm, and for a time contemplated the virtues of benevolent colonialism. But when war finally broke out between the U.S. and Philippine Armies, all notion of Filipinos as political beings disappeared, and the benevolent vision of colonialism was discarded. The Filipinos were increasingly represented as savage Indians who could only be subdued with overwhelming force.²⁰⁸

From the outset, the soldiers' perspectives were more personal.²⁰⁹ The Oregon Volunteers rarely deliberated over the alternative visions of American greatness that

occupied the *Oregonian* in the early months of the war. Yet, the shifting conditions of their deployment had a pronounced effect on their view of the racial landscape. From the moment they arrived, the soldiers described the human environment of the Philippines in accordance with a racial taxonomy—but it was an uncertain taxonomy. To be sure, the Filipinos were considered a lower order, but the soldiers likened them to a variety of other races in ways that admitted both affection and sympathy as well as condescension.

When Spain, the shared adversary, was defeated, and once material conflicts between the American and Philippine armies became serious, the soldiers' vision of the natives changed for the worse. As war against the native forces began in earnest, the Oregon soldiers began to view themselves not as observers in land organized by race, but partisans in a struggle defined by race. In the spring of 1899, Oregon soldiers scarcely ever employed political or diplomatic terms in describing the war. After the war against the Filipinos began in February of 1899, their letters and diaries became a continuous record of racial hostility toward all the native inhabitants of the war zone. The war became one of racial retribution. Filipinos, regardless of age, gender, military status, or political affiliation were viewed in racial aggregate as the enemy—and as an enemy beyond the sympathy of civilization.

Notes

I. Introduction to the Philippine Wars

¹ President McKinley's message to the House of Representatives, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, *Congressional Record* (11 April 1898), 3706.

² The question of whether the National Guard units could be used as an invasion forces was disputed at the time. The language of the U.S. Constitution described the militia as a force to "execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," Article I, Section VIII. The decision to reconstitute state National Guards as a new volunteer army was the result of an elaborate set of compromises between those favoring long-term reliance on militias and those advocating the creation of a stronger professional army. With a regular army comprising less than 25,000 troops on the eve of the war, and a national militia system comprising over 100,000, the compromise was based both on politics and on expedience. These matters are treated in detail in Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri, 1971), chapters 1 and 2.

³ *Oregonian* (Portland), 3 May 1898, p.4.

⁴ My introduction provides an overview of the Oregon Volunteers' service in the Philippine wars. Readers interested in a more complete history of events should consult W.D.B. Dodson, "Official History of the Operations of the Second U.S.V. Infantry" in *The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection*, Brigadier-General C. U. Gantenbein, compiler (Salem, Oregon: W.H. Leeds, State Printer, 1902). For a general history of American soldiers in these wars, see Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2000) and Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*.

⁵ On the Katipunan and the politics of Philippine nationalism, see Stuart Creighton Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation*": *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), 33-55; Teodore A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People*, revised (Quezon City, Philippines: Maylaya Books, 1967), 131-256; and John Morgan Gates, *School Books and Kragis: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, Conn., 1973), 10-31.

⁶ The exact terms of this agreement (the Truce of Biyak-no-bato) are hotly debated to the present. Those sympathetic to the Katipuneros have describe it as a political settlement in which the rebels exacted promises of political liberalization in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. Critics of the insurgent leaders have often claimed that there was no such agreement regarding political reforms, and that rebel leaders simply accepted a cash bribe to betray the movement. Most historians are agreed, however, that the insurgent generals took the money with the intention of securing arms abroad for the renewal of the struggle in the future. Agoncillo, 203-236 and Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 35.

⁷ In the context of conflicting claims of sovereignty during the months that followed, American and Filipino leaders gave very different descriptions of the agreement between Dewey and the junta. Aguinaldo asserted that he had received a pledge of American support for Philippine independence. Dewey gave varying accounts, in some cases implausibly denying that he ever communicated with Aguinaldo, in others merely claiming that Aguinaldo had mistaken a temporary military arrangement for a political alliance that conveyed recognition.

⁸ Linn, 23-5; See also correspondence of Generals Anderson and Merritt between early June and early August for a clear illustration of the shifting relationship between the U.S. and Philippine armies. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.

⁹ On this period of tense occupation, see Linn, 27-41; Dodson, 49-52; Gates, 21-67; Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 43-55.

¹⁰ On the ratification debate in the United States, see Brian P. Damiani, *Advocates of Empire: William McKinley, the Senate and American Expansion, 1898-1899*, Foreign Economic Policy of the United States (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin, 1970); Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against the Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985); and Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963).

¹¹ On America's economic interests, see Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire* and Louis A. Perez, Jr., *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1998). For an explanation of relevant domestic political interests, see Damiani, *Advocates of Empire* and John Offner, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1896-1898* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1992). H. Wayne Morgan provides the classic account of presidential policy as the product of rational humanitarian considerations in *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion*, America in Crisis, Robert A. Divine, ed. Beisner, *Twelve Against the Empire*; Healy, *The Imperialist Urge*; and Kristen L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) address the cultural and intellectual sources of American intervention.

II. The Cuban and Philippine Rebellions

Viewed Through the Pages of the Portland Oregonian, 1895-1899

¹² LaFeber, *The New Empire*, 37.

¹³ "Short Account of Palma's Words at Junta Meeting," *Oregonian*, 26 December, 1895, p. 2.

¹⁴ "Rapidly Advancing Cuban Insurgents Pushing for the Capital City," *Oregonian*, 26 December, 1898, p. 1.

¹⁵ "Belligerency and Independence," *Oregonian*, 26 December 1895, p. 4.

¹⁶ Many historians have argued that the war soon settled into a stalemate, creating commercial and humanitarian conditions that the United States could not tolerate. H. Wayne Morgan and John Offner both take this position. Recently, however, Louis Perez has argued that it was the State Department's growing belief in the impending success of the revolt that led the United States to intervene in order to prevent a completely independent Cuban government. His revision, however, is largely an assessment of McKinley's perception of the situation, not of the facts on the ground in Cuba. At present, I am inclined to accept the usual description of a stalemate. See John Offner, 226-228; Perez, 7-17.

¹⁷ "Christmas in Havana: Cuban Insurgents May Celebrate in the Capital. Campos Has Been Out Generalled," *Oregonian*, 25 December 1895, p. 1.

¹⁸ "Panic in Havana," *Oregonian*, 25 December, 1895, p.1.

¹⁹ That Oregon soldiers would likely serve in the Philippines was first stated in an untitled announcement in the *Oregonian*, 1 May 1898, p. 4.

²⁰ [untitled report from London] *Oregonian*, 3 May 1898, p. 1.

²¹ "Its Far-Reaching Consequences," *Oregonian*, 4 May 1898, p. 4.

²² "Protectorate Wanted. Plans of the Insurgents for the Philippines [sic] Republic," *Oregonian*, 3 May 1898, p. 1.

²³ "Particulars Meager," *Oregonian*, 3 May 1898, p.6.

²⁴ [untitled editorial] *Oregonian* 3 May 1898, p. 6.

²⁵ LaFeber describes the assumptions about commercial and naval expansion shared by many leaders, as well as the slow development of support for territorial control of the Philippines in the fall of 1898. LaFeber, 393.

²⁶ "The Prize is Ours," *Oregonian*, 19 January 1899, p.4.

²⁷ [untitled editorial], *Oregonian*, 22 January 1899, p. 4.

²⁸ "Battle at Manila," *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p.1. On page 4, the *Oregonian* does acknowledge a contradicting account of the battle received from the Filipino Junta in the United States. However, its does not seem to be given any credence in the rest of the issue or in those of the next few days. "An Engagement Yesterday," *Oregonian* 6 February 1899, p. 4.

²⁹ Otis to Adjutant Generals, 5 February 1899, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 894. Compare Otis' account of the outbreak of the hostilities to more recent scholarship on the event in Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation*," 57-66. Miller argues that the outbreak of the war was both foreseen and intended by Otis. In his final report on his Philippine command, Otis' asserts that the Filipinos were attempting, for political reasons, to provoke the American army into firing the first shot. Yet, it appears, from his own record of policy toward the Filipinos from December 1898 to February 1899, that he was pressing the Philippine Army very hard in the hopes of exacting total capitulation or provoking war. See "Report of Major General E. S. Otis. . . Manila , Aug. 31, 1899" in *The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers*, 442-495.

³⁰ "Our Boys Pay with Blood for Cheap Twaddle," *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p. 3.

³¹ [untitled editorial], *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p. 3.

³² “Incapable of Growth,” *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p. 4. Not all of the animosity toward this political clique is attributable to the subject at issue. A strong dose of the *Oregonian*’s Republican party bias is also evident. Many of the petitioners are referred to as “obsequious, chronic Clevelandites.” Most *Oregonian* writers hated New England Mugwumps even more than did the Democrats.

³³ I make no attempt in this essay to reach authoritative conclusions on the process by which the writers arrived at these claims. Some may have constructed these arguments cynically, in order to justify America’s aims and dispense with ideological criticisms. It seems equally probable that the process was unconscious: writers were so sincere in believing the justice of America’s claims that their perspectives on the American ideology evolved to accommodate them.

³⁴ “Effect on Vote. Battle Will Cause Ratification of Treaty. Opposition Weakens,” *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p. 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁷ “The Philippines Rebellion,” *Oregonian*, 7 February 1899, p. 4.

³⁸ Miller, 37-38.

³⁹ “Slaves of Phrases: Cruelty of the Doctrine of Abandoning the Filipinos,” *Oregonian*, 21 January 1899, p. 2.

⁴⁰ [untitled editorial] *Oregonian*, 21 January 1899, p.4.

⁴¹ “Consent of the Governed: A Waste of Time to Pay Attention to That Theory,” *Oregonian*, 23 January 1899, p.4.

⁴² “New York Meeting,” *Oregonian*, 24 January 1899, p. 4.

⁴³ “The Philippine Rebellion,” *Oregonian*, 7 February 1899, p. 4.

⁴⁴ I have seen no examples of statements by Anti-imperialist senators that advocate armed struggle by the Filipinos against the United States. Records of the Senate’s treaty ratification debates and of its hearings on the insurrection prove the editorialist’s claim false. See Damiani and also *American Imperialism and The Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines—1902*, ed. Henry F. Graff (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969) (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings). It is also well established that most of the Anti-imperialists were far from viewing Filipinos as their political or social equals; see Beisner.

-
- ⁴⁵ "Senator Hoar's Resolution. It is Vicious and Faithless, Not a Rational Argument," *Oregonian*, 22 January 1899, p. 4.
- ⁴⁶ "Monroe Doctrine Established," 25 December 1895, p. 4.
- ⁴⁷ "If War Must Be, Let It Be With Britain, the Bully of the World," *Oregonian*, 25 December 1895, p. 4.
- ⁴⁸ "History Repeats Itself," *Oregonian*, 19 January 1899, p. 4.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ [untitled editorial], *Oregonian*, 23 January 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵¹ "The Philippine Rebellion," *Oregonian*, 7 February 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵² "The Great Fact of 1898," *Oregonian*, 22 January 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵³ [editorial] 7 February 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵⁴ *Oregonian*, 6 February 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵⁵ *Oregonian*, 7 February 1899, p. 4.
- ⁵⁶ *Oregonian*, 8 March 1899, p. 1.
- ⁵⁷ *Oregonian*, 11 March 1899, p. 1; 17 March 1899, p. 1.
- ⁵⁸ *Oregonian*, 19 March 1899, p. 16.
- ⁵⁹ D.P. Thompson, "An Unworthy Book," *Oregonian*, 16 March 1899, p. 4.
- ⁶⁰ *Oregonian*, 20 March 1899, p. 4.
- ⁶¹ *Oregonian*, 20 March 1899, p. 5.
- ⁶² LaFeber shows the political influence of this race-ideology with respect to American expansion in the Pacific and Asia, beginning as early as the 1860s in the person of William Seward: LaFeber, *The New Empire*, 27-28.
- ⁶³ Stuart Creighton Miller touches on this idea of the Philippines as a new western frontier in "The American Soldier and the Conquest of the Philippines," in *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History*, Peter Stanley, ed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 34.
- ⁶⁴ *Oregonian*, 13 July 1899, p. 4.
- ⁶⁵ *Oregonian*, 14 March 1899, p. 4.
- ⁶⁶ *Oregonian*, 13 March 1899, p. 2.
- ⁶⁷ *Oregonian*, 14 March 1899, p. 8.
- ⁶⁸ *Oregonian*, 13 July 1899, p. 8.
- ⁶⁹ *Oregonian*, 14 March 1899, p. 4.
- ⁷⁰ *Oregonian*, 14 March 1899, p. 4.
- ⁷¹ *Oregonian*, 15 March 1899, p. 3.

⁷² *Oregonian*, 15 March 1899, p. 3.

⁷³ This perspective was common both among civilian and military leaders. In the 1902 Senate hearings on the conduct of the Philippine War, military science expert, Arthur L. Wagner testified in support of the American practice of burning villages and displacing civilians in order to root out enemies. He asserted that, though “it is not always possible to discriminate between those who are active enemies and those who are not. . . it would be justifiable to destroy the town.” General Walter P. Hughes, when questioned about tactics that brought suffering or death “upon the women and the little children,” of the Philippines defended himself by asserting that “the women and children are part of the family, and where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably worse in that way than in any other,” *Senate Hearings*, 129, 64-5.

⁷⁴ *Oregonian*, 11 March 1899, p.1.

⁷⁵ *Oregonian*, 14 July 1899, p. 8.

⁷⁶ *Oregonian*, 11 March 1899, p. 4.

⁷⁷ English race-theorist Benjamin Kidd had provoked a major debate among American and English readers over the prospects of Anglo-Saxon rule in the tropics. He argued that tropical peoples could not govern themselves, and must therefore be led by European colonizers. Yet, he also warned of the deleterious consequences to Europeans of long residence in such unwholesome climates, Healy, 132-4.

⁷⁸ In the enlistment records of the Oregon Volunteers, only 531 of 1352 men identified themselves as church members, *Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers*, xii-xiii. On the connections between religion and expansionism in the United States, see Healy, chapter #7.

⁷⁹ *Oregonian*, 20 March 1899 p. 5

⁸⁰ *Oregonian*, 17 March, p. 10.

⁸¹ *Oregonian*, 20 March, p. 5.

⁸² *Oregonian*, 13 July 1899 p. 4.

⁸³ This seems to have been true nationally, both among annexationists and among the anti-imperialists. On President Washington’s birthday, the *Oregonian* printed two speeches that had been given to honor the occasion, one from Charles Kendall Adams, the annexationist president of the Union League of Chicago, and one from William Jennings Bryan. The first asserts the inevitability of American conquests in the Pacific: “[of] the processes by which the United States has expanded since the

adoption of the Constitution. Few of them have been the result of a deliberate purpose of conquest. They have come from the impact of more civilized with less civilized peoples and the less civilized have been obliged to give way.” Bryan, who was considered an objectionable anti-imperialist by the Republican establishment in Portland, may have been critical of the Philippine expansion, but his racial thinking was essentially the same as Adams’. His speech opposes the conquest of inferior peoples because of its tendency to militarize the political culture of the United States, and because it threatened to replace a “homogeneous republic” with a “heterogeneous empire.” *Oregonian*, 23 February 1899, p. 2.

⁸⁴ *Oregonian*, 18 March 1899.

⁸⁵ *Oregonian*, 21 March 1899, p. 8. This article, though printed in mid-March, describes the outbreak of war in early February. Feature stories on the war often used correspondence that had taken a long while to reach Portland, whereas daily updates on major events came swiftly by wire.

⁸⁶ *Oregonian*, 22 March 1899, pp. 8-9.

⁸⁷ *Oregonian*, 4 May 1899, p. 12.

⁸⁸ *Oregonian*, 5 May 1899, p. 9.

⁸⁹ *Oregonian*, 5 May 1899, p. 10.

⁹⁰ *Oregonian*, 16 March 1899, p. 4. A similar approach is taken by Thomas Dyer, but with a focus on race, rather than gender, in examining the thought of Theodore Roosevelt in *Theodore Roosevelt, and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1980).

⁹¹ *Oregonian*, 18 March 1899, p. 4.

⁹² See Dyer’s explanation the theory of “race suicide,” Chapter#7.

⁹³ *Oregonian* 22 March 1899, p. 4.

⁹⁴ This is not to say that race was absent from the calculations of the Anti-Imperialist League. Much of its membership considered the exclusion of foreign races and low-wage workers to be among the strongest arguments against the annexation of the Philippines. See Beisner’s general analysis (219-20) as well as his treatment of Carl Schurz (127) and Charles Eliot Norton (70-1).

⁹⁵ *Oregonian*, 16 March 1899, p. 4.

⁹⁶ *Oregonian*, 11 March 1899, p. 4

III. *Observations of the Oregon Soldiers, May 1898—July 1900*

⁹⁷ Newell correspondence, [n.d.].

⁹⁸ Newell correspondence, 14 November 1898, 28 January 1899.

⁹⁹ Newell correspondence, 22 August 1898.

¹⁰⁰ Newell correspondence, 13 February 1899.

¹⁰¹ Newell correspondence, 13 March 1900; 12 July 1900.

¹⁰² Newell correspondence, 12 July 1900.

¹⁰³ Telfer correspondence, 31 May 1898.

¹⁰⁴ Telfer correspondence, 18 July 1898; Telfer correspondence, 3 October 1898: "the officers. . . are so divided up that it is hard to come at anything like united action. This rank question causes much feeling and prevents friendly relations."

¹⁰⁵ Telfer correspondence, 22 November 1898.

¹⁰⁶ Telfer correspondence, 22 November 1898; Telfer correspondence, 22 August 1898.

¹⁰⁷ Telfer correspondence, 11 November 1898.

¹⁰⁸ Thompson, 294-6.

¹⁰⁹ Sara Bunnet, ed. *Manila Envelopes: Oregon Volunteer Lt. George M. Telfer's Spanish-American War Letters* (Portland Oregon: Oregon Historical Society, 1987), x, xi; H.C. Thompson, "War Without Medals," Oregon Historical Quarterly, 59(4): 296.

¹¹⁰ Chriss A. Bell diary, 6 June 1898, MSS 2930, Oregon Historical Society, Portland.

¹¹¹ Thompson, 297.

¹¹² George F. Telfer correspondence to wife and children, 22 May 1898, MSS 2635, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

¹¹³ *The Soldier's Letter*, vol I (November, 1898), Albert Southwick papers, MSS 2714, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon, p. 10.

¹¹⁴ George Lemon Newell correspondence to mother, 22 August 1898, George Lemon Newell papers, 1898-1901, MSS 2550, Oregon Historical Society.

¹¹⁵ Bell diary, 20 August and 21 August, 1898.

¹¹⁶ *The Soldier's Letter*, pp. 1, 10.

¹¹⁷ Telfer correspondence, 25 September 1898.

¹¹⁸ Charles Henry Martin correspondence to wife, 3 September 1898, MSS 1153, Oregon Historical Society.

-
- ¹¹⁹ Martin correspondence, 25/6 October 1898.
- ¹²⁰ Martin correspondence, 17 October 1898.
- ¹²¹ Martin correspondence, 20 November 1898.
- ¹²² Martin correspondence, 28 August 1898.
- ¹²³ Martin correspondence, 28 August 1898.
- ¹²⁴ Albert M. Southwick correspondence to mother and sisters, 25 August 1898, Albert M. Southwick papers, MSS 2741, Oregon Historical Society.
- ¹²⁵ Newell, 22 August 1898.
- ¹²⁶ Willis Arthur Platts diary, 17 August 1898, MSS 376, Oregon Historical Society.
- ¹²⁷ Telfer's correspondence indicates that he was both proud of his middle class household and struggling financially to keep it afloat. As a civilian he had worked in a series of low-level managerial jobs, *Manila Envelopes*, xv. The ambitious Charles Henry Martin was at the beginning of a successful military career that would eventually lead to a political career and the governorship of Oregon, Gordon Dodds, *The American Northwest: A History of Oregon and Washington* (Wheeling, Ill.: Forum Press, 1986), 228-232. Martin was chagrined by fraternization between the orders: "officers of as high rank as colonel driving with privates and chatting with them as familiarly as though they were brothers in rank? But the way of the average Volunteer is beyond comprehension," Martin correspondence, 26 December 1898.
- ¹²⁸ Telfer correspondence, 8 September 1898.
- ¹²⁹ Telfer correspondence, 18 July 1898.
- ¹³⁰ Telfer correspondence, 7 October 1898.
- ¹³¹ Telfer correspondence, 3 June 1898.
- ¹³² Platts diary, 20 January 1899.
- ¹³³ Southick, 25 August 1898.
- ¹³⁴ Southwick correspondence, 5 August 1898.
- ¹³⁵ Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation*."
- ¹³⁶ Thompson, 317.
- ¹³⁷ Telfer correspondence, 19 February 1899.
- ¹³⁸ My work addresses the White Oregon soldiers' racial categorization of the Filipinos. An interesting parallel study of America's Black soldiers can be found in William Gatewood, "'Smoked Yankees' and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois, 1971). Though Black soldiers arrived in the Philippines only as the Oregon Volunteers departed in the summer of

1899, their writings provide valuable insight into the race-psychology of the war. Black soldiers were often sympathetic to the situation of the Filipinos under Spanish and American rule, and they noted that the White U.S. troops regarded both the American Blacks and the natives as “niggers.” Furthermore, the Philippine Army was aware of the relationship between Blacks and Whites in America, and created well-targeted propaganda to recruit Black Americans to their cause. The Filipinos distributed pamphlets publicizing racial discrimination and violence in the United States, and urging Black soldiers to cross the lines, Gatewood, 268.

¹³⁹ Telfer correspondence, 18 July 1898.

¹⁴⁰ Telfer correspondence, 16 October 1898.

¹⁴¹ see references to Kipling in Telfer's correspondence, 31 May 1898; 23 September 1898.

¹⁴² Telfer correspondence, 23 September 1898.

¹⁴³ Telfer correspondence, 9 October 1899.

¹⁴⁴ Telfer correspondence, 15 January 1899.

¹⁴⁵ Telfer correspondence, 20 January 1899.

¹⁴⁶ Telfer correspondence, 6 February 1899.

¹⁴⁷ Telfer correspondence, 13 February 1899.

¹⁴⁸ Telfer correspondence, 17 March 1899.

¹⁴⁹ Telfer correspondence, 22 March 1899.

¹⁵⁰ An interesting example of this is to be found in Telfer's account of his occupation of the village of Gagalangin. He describes himself as the town's mayor and explains the benefits levied from the local population, Telfer correspondence, 28 March 1899.

¹⁵¹ Telfer correspondence, 28 March 1899.

¹⁵² Telfer correspondence, 7 April 1899.

¹⁵³ Southwick correspondence, 30 June 1898. The dating of Southwick's letters is a bit imprecise. It appears that he dated his letters on the day he began them, but added to them for many days thereafter. My citations provide his recorded date as well as suspected dates for the specific entry.

¹⁵⁴ Southwick correspondence, c. 30 June 1898 [possibly written at anytime in early July].

¹⁵⁵ Southwick correspondence, 5 August 1898 [the material surrounding the above passage makes clear that it was written from within Manila, probably in the first week following its capture on 13 August].

¹⁵⁶ Southwick correspondence, 25 August 1898 [this entry may have been written at any point during the fall after the date given].

¹⁵⁷ Southwick correspondence, 18 January 1898.

¹⁵⁸ Southwick correspondence, 10 February 1899 [entry written sometime between the 10th and 21st of February].

¹⁵⁹ Southwick correspondence, 25 February 1899 [entry written sometime between 25 February and 9 March].

¹⁶⁰ Southwick correspondence, 25 February 1899 [entry written sometime between 25 February and 9 March 1899].

¹⁶¹ Southwick correspondence, 25 February 1899 [entry written sometime between 25 February and 9 March].

¹⁶² See Southwick correspondence entries labeled 22 April 1899 [written between 22 April and the end of May] and 9 April 1898 [1899]—probably written between 9 April and 22 April 1899.

¹⁶³ Southwick correspondence, May 1898 [no day recorded].

¹⁶⁴ Southwick correspondence, 13 March, 1899 [entry written sometime between 13 March and 22 April]. In the spring of 1899, Southwick, along with most of the American military establishment, misunderstood the relationship between tribal allegiances and the Philippine independence movement. Later campaigns in the Visayas and outside Tagalog regions of Luzon would demonstrate that the independence movement had strong support outside of the Tagalog tribe.

¹⁶⁵ Bell had, in fact, carried law books with him to the Philippines and intended to use the return voyage as an opportunity to study the rules of evidence, Bell diary, 25-30 January 1899. In his enlistment papers, Bell recorded “lawyer” as his profession, rather than “student,” but he does not seem to have been a practicing lawyer yet, *Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers*, 270.

¹⁶⁶ Bell diary, 2 June 1898.

¹⁶⁷ Bell diary, 2 June 1898.

¹⁶⁸ Bell diary, 1 September 1898.

¹⁶⁹ Bell diary, 13 August 1898.

¹⁷⁰ Bell diary, 14 August 1898.

¹⁷¹ Bell diary, 21 August 1898.

¹⁷² Bell diary, 21 August 1898.

¹⁷³ Bell diary, 2 February 1898.

¹⁷⁴ Bell diary, 6 February 1899.

¹⁷⁵ Bell diary, 6 February 1899.

¹⁷⁶ Bell diary, 7 February 1899.

¹⁷⁷ Bell diary, 8 February 1899.

¹⁷⁸ Bell diary, 12 April 1899.

¹⁷⁹ Bell diary, 12 April 1899.

¹⁸⁰ Bell diary, 24 May 1899.

¹⁸¹ Bell diary, 18 June 1899. It is widely reported that American troops referred to their Filipino enemies as “gugus,” but Chriss A. Bell's diary contains the only occurrences of the word that I have encountered in the personal papers of Oregon soldiers.

¹⁸² Platts diary, 20 January 1899 on views of intermarriage.

¹⁸³ Platts diary, 5 July 1898.

¹⁸⁴ Platts diary, 6 February 1899.

¹⁸⁵ Platts diary, 9 February 1899.

¹⁸⁶ Platts diary, 23 February 1899.

¹⁸⁷ Platts diary, 23 February 1899.

¹⁸⁸ Platts diary, 11 March 1899.

¹⁸⁹ Platts diary, 15 March 1899; 5 May 1899, “Lots of fun shooting dogs.”

¹⁹⁰ Platts diary, 16-21 March 1899.

¹⁹¹ Platts diary, 18 April 1899.

¹⁹² Platts diary, 18 April 1899.

¹⁹³ Joseph G. Evans correspondence to mother, 30 June 1899, MSS 2449, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

¹⁹⁴ Evans correspondence, 16 March 1899.

¹⁹⁵ Elliot Rodgers journal, 2 May 1899, MSS 2628, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

¹⁹⁶ Rodgers journal, 24 May 1899.

¹⁹⁷ Rodgers journal, 12 May 1899.

¹⁹⁸ Francis Prucha shows that the U.S. military had a separate set of conventions for Indian war, due both to racial thought and to the demands of guerilla warfare. Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great White Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, abridged edition (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1984), 168-180.

¹⁹⁹ Many signalmen were recruited nationally, but individually assigned to service with other states' volunteer regiments, Cosmas, 133-4.

²⁰⁰ "Big Kelly at Manila," [Chicago] *Sunday Chronicle*, 6 August 1899, p. 17, clipping, Edward E. Kelly papers, MSS 1434, Oregon Historical Society.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Telfer correspondence, 15 January 1899.

²⁰³ Telfer correspondence, 22 March 1899.

²⁰⁴ Newell correspondence, 27 April 1899.

²⁰⁵ Martin correspondence, 28 August 1899.

IV. Conclusion

²⁰⁶ The Oregon soldiers' perspective on America's racial mission differed from that of most American political leaders in several significant respects. Though most White Americans, from foot soldiers to the president, believed in America's racial superiority and leadership mandate over the Filipinos, American leaders had a far more paternalistic perspective than Oregon soldiers. Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, and General Arthur MacArthur and Governor William Howard Taft, in their proconsular posts in the Philippines, all permitted a great deal of brutality in the conduct of the war, but considered the American occupation to be a "tuitionary" project that would slowly advance the natives toward civilization. These leaders believed that the Filipinos trailed behind the Anglo-Saxons in their historic evolution, but should be shepherded forward. The Oregon Soldiers, in contrast, showed no concern for the future welfare of the Filipinos, and often understood their mission as genocidal, not paternalistic. Glenn May and Richard Collin have connected this paternalistic perspective among American leaders to a broader culture of progressivism in America, but this culture does not appear to have been shared by Oregon Soldiers. Glenn May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980); Richard Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1985), 150. Consult the following additional sources for the perspectives of McKinley, Roosevelt, McArthur, and Taft: William McKinley, *Speeches and*

Addresses of William McKinley (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1900), 256; Thomas Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana, 1980); Theodore Roosevelt, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: P.F. Collier and Son, Kraus Reprint Co., 1970), 217, 64, 569; Testimony of Arthur MacArthur, Senate Hearings, 136; Testimony of William Howard Taft, Senate Hearings, 44, 59, 124.

²⁰⁷ Beisner argues persuasively that most of the so-called imperialists and anti-imperialists of 1898-9 shared the same general view of race and the same general goal of expanding national economic power abroad, Beisner, conclusion.

²⁰⁸ For an historiographic review of claims regarding Americans' idealist and realist motives in the Spanish-American-Philippine War, see Perez, 36-8.

²⁰⁹ Stuart Creighton Miller contends that American soldiers were focused on national honor and victory, but were little concerned with the future of the islands. He notes that many soldiers were enthusiastic about executing orders to commit horrible atrocities. Yet, Miller does not conceive of the struggle as essentially racial in its psychology. The papers of Oregon Soldiers suggest that they focused on personal opportunities more than national ones, but also that they were intent upon America's retention of the islands. They were animated by a racial hostility that went far beyond Miller's conception of the soldiers' nationalism. Miller, *The American Soldier and the Conquest of the Philippines*, 19-29.

WORKS CITED

Secondary Sources

Agoncillo, Teodore A. *History of the Filipino People*. Revised ed. Quezon City, Philippines: Maylaya Books, 1967.

Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against the Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985.

Brown, Charles H. *The Correspondents' War: Journalists in the Spanish-American War*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).

Collin, Richard. *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1985.

Cosmas, Graham A. *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War*. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1971.

Damiani, Brian P. *Advocates of Empire: William McKinley, the Senate and American Expansion, 1898-1899*. Foreign Economic Policy of the United States. New York: Garland Publishing, 1987.

Dodds, Gordon B. *The American Northwest: A History of Oregon and Washington*. Wheeling, Ill.: Forum Press, 1986.

Dodson, W.D.B. "Official History of the Operations of the Second U.S.V. Infantry" in *The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection*. Compiled by Brigadier-General C. U. Gantenbein, (Salem, Ore: W.H. Leeds, State Printer, 1902.

Dyer, Thomas. *Theodore Roosevelt, and the Idea of Race*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1980.

- Gates, John Morgan. *School Books and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.
- Gatewood, Willard B. *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898-1903*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1975.
- Healy, David. *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s*. Madison, Wisc: University of Wisconsin, 1970.
- Hoganson, Kristen L. *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963.
- Morgan, H. Wayne. *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion*. America in Crisis, Edited by Robert A. Divine. New York: John Wiley, 1967.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
- May, Glenn. *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.
- Miller, Stuart Creighton. "The American Soldier and the Conquest of the Philippines." In *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History*. Edited by Peter Stanley. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- Miller, Stuart Creighton. *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.

Offner, John, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1896-1898*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1992.

Perez, Louis A. *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1998.

Prucha, Francis Paul. *The Great White Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*. Abridged edition. Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska, 1984.

Published Primary Sources:

American Imperialism and The Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines—1902. Edited by Henry F. Graff. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969.

Congressional Record, Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Fifty-fifth Congress, Second Session, vol XXXI. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898

Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.

Gatewood, Willard B. “‘Smoked Yankees’ and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1971.

McKinley, William. *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley*. New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1900.

Oregonian (Portland). 1895—1899.

Otis, Elwell. "Report of Major General E. S. Otis. . . Manila , Aug. 31, 1999." In *The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection*. Compiled by Brigadier-General C. U. Gantenbein. Salem, Ore: W.H. Leeds, State Printer, 1902.

Roosevelt, Theodore. *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*. New York: P.F. Collier and Son, Kraus Reprint Co., 1970.

The Soldier's Letter, Vol I, Nov 1898. Albert Southwick papers, MSS 2714, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Telfer, George M. *Manila Envelopes: Oregon Volunteer Lt. George M. Telfer's Spanish American War Letters*. Edited by Sara Bunnet. Portland, Ore.: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1987.

Thompson, H.C. "War Without Medals." *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, 59(4): 293-325.

Rost, James Stanley. *The Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish-American war and Philippine Insurrection: The Annotated Diary of Chris A Bell*. M.A. Thesis Portland State University, 1991.

Manuscripts:

Chriss A. Bell. Correspondence and diary, MSS 2930, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Joseph G. Evans. Journal and Correspondence , MSS 2449, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Edward E. Kelly. Personal Papers, MSS 1434, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Charles Henry Martin. Letters from the Philippines, MSS 1153, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

George Lemon Newell. Papers, 1898-1901, MSS 2550, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Willis Arthur Platts. Diary 1898-9, MSS 376, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Elliot Rodgers. Journal, MSS 2628, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

Albert M. Southwick. Papers, MSS 2714, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

George F. Telfer. Correspondence, MSS 2635, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.